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Introduction 
I want to begin this chapter with a concept, you could call it a guiding 
belief if you like, which is that critics write for a reason, that they do not 
merely criticize texts because they exist, but because they serve as a means by 
which concepts can be expressed, ideas promulgated. Of course, this may not 
be the only reason a text is criticized, nor the only reason a critic chooses to 
write. My belief is rather that the act of criticism is also an act of trying to 
express opinions, and ideas. I want to explore how such a concept can be 
developed into a theory of criticism. So the perspective from which I shall 
consider the nature of literary criticism has an implied focus on why critics 
make certain statements about literary works, rather than whether such 
statements can be justified (although, of course, that will also be considered). 
The critics I have chosen to examine closely for this purpose are William 
Empson, Roland Barthes and Harold Bloom. The reason I have chosen these 
critics is that although at first sight their approaches to texts appear entirely 
disparate, a closer examination indicates similarities which, in turn, lead on to 
an exploration of why they wrote criticism. I have chosen to closely analyse 
particular works by these critics, focusing on each critic's panicular treatment 
of his subject rather than undertaking lengthy comparison between their 
different approaches. I hope that the reader will be led to compare these critics 
by the critical method I have chosen to adopt. I have arranged the chapters in 
chronological order for convenience. While I would not claim that each critic 
is typical of his generation, it is interesting to see how the concept of creating a 
new critical vocabulary in order to polemicize is treated over this timespan. 
If it is true that "people don't think up a set of assumptions or beliefs; 
they think up a set of stories, and derive the assumptions and beliefs from the 
stories . . . then we may examine any piece of criticism as a story, 
criticising it in the same way we may criticise a novel, poem, or play. 
Alternatively, if it is not true, that is, if people do think up beliefs and 
assumptions and then write stories to convince readeis(convert them to these 
beliefs), then the techniques they use to do this may be interesting and worth 
examining. I think that Empson, Barthes, and Bloom are each trying to 
convince readers to accept a particular approach to criticism and, maybe, to 
life. I think this is inevitable ~ we cannot and do not shut our beliefs in a 
cupboard and throw away the key when we open a book. We start with our 
beliefs and maybe what distinguishes readers from critics is that the latter hold 
their beliefs so strongly that they want others to share them. 
Another way of looking at this is to view Uterary criticism not as a single 
discipline, but as a collection of frameworks of "languages". Within each 
"language" there are key concepts^or example, that of poetic structure), which 
are defined variously by different people. Critics disagree simply because they 
have different beliefs as to the nature of poetry. R. S. Crane argued along 
these lines, considering a critical language to^simply a set of assumptions 
regarding those principles and distinctions which are needed in order to engage 
1 Northrop Frye, Interview with Imre Salusinszky in Imre Salusinszky's Criticism in Society: 
Interviews with Jacques Derrida, Harold Bloom, Geoffrey Hartman, Frank Kermode, Edward 
Said. Barbara Johnson, Frank Leniricchia and J. Hillis Miller (New York and London: 
Methuen, 1987), p. 31. 
in criticism.2 However, this is not a situation Crane admires, for he feels that 
such assumptions are chosen arbitrarily, and their explanatory powers are 
assumed.^ According to Crane, both the New Critics, the Structuralists, and 
mavericks like Harold Bloom, are to be deplored for having chosen their 
assumptions for no adequate reason. 
However, it can be argued that such critics "chose" their assumptions 
(one cannot but wonder how much "choice" is involved) because they find in 
them some explanatory power, which in turn depends upon their finding 
something to be explained. I do not agree with Crane that a critic chooses 
his/her "tools" in order to discover what he/she wants to know.'^ I think a 
critic develops a particular method to support his/her beliefs -- to both justify 
and promulgate them. 
The question I wish to raise is whether critics are trying to understand 
texts at all when they practice criticism. In this thesis I want to examine the 
possibility that instead critics are largely concerned with trying to use texts as a 
means of expressing ideas, not just about texts, but about the world in general. 
Whether this is a difference in kind or degree depends, I think, on whether 
understanding the world is considered to be essentially the same activity as 
understanding a text. This is not a question on which I would like to pass 
judgment, preferring to focus instead on what it is to understand and read 
texts, allowing the reader to form his/her own conclusions. 
2See R.S. Crane, The Languages of Criticism and the Structure of Poetry, The Alexander 
Lectures, 1951-2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953), pp. 13-20. 
'^Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
^Ibid., p. 31. 
To discuss one's reaction to a text in terms of understanding a text, or of 
having grasped the intention of the author, is to legitimize one's own version 
of the text, and give "validity" to the associated ideas explicated in the act of 
criticism (the ideas being "justified" by the acceptance of one's reading of a 
text). Whereas to consider one's reaction to a text as being one among many 
possible interpretations of that text is to recognize that one has simply 
presented one set of ideas (not the only possible set) in relation to a particular 
work. To presume that "the author is dead" allows one to argue that his/her 
intentions (ideas) are irrelevant, to talk about the meaning of a text without 
having to try to sort out which interpretations were intended by the author, to 
impose one's own interpretation. However, the text to some extent sets its 
own context, and thus defines the range of possible interpretations. It does 
this by controlling ambiguity (limiting meaning), reference to understood 
cultural norms (whether accepting or rejecting these), and so forth. Thus the 
text sets its own context by its referentiality. This does not mean that we, as 
readers, cannot supplement the range of possible interpretations. We can 
define the meaning of a text as both our interpretations and the context the text 
sets up. 
In my examination of 5/Z, Seven Types of Ambiguity, Shelley's 
Mythmaking, and Poetry and Repression, I will focus on guiding concepts or 
ideas expressed by Barthes, Empson, and Bloom to show how for them 
criticism is inevitably bound up with the elucidation of a particular set of 
concepts, ideas, or ideals. In showing this I hope to provide an indication of 
an approach to criticism with a view to understanding how a particular piece of 
criticism may be described in terms of polemics rather than the pursuit of 
understanding. 
William Empson's Seven Types of Ambiguity. 
William Empson was right - Seven Types of Ambiguity could be 
considered a "heap";^ but an interesting one. The work is interesting because it 
can be characterised as tracing the fortunes of two, continually intertwined, 
types of critical theory. The first deals with the postulated seven types of 
ambiguity, the second with the concept of ambiguity itself as central to Western 
thought. 
Unlike Barthes, Empson did not engage in the close analysis of a 
particular text in order to convince the reader that texts can be analysed in terms 
of ambiguity, and that the concept of ambiguity is central to our culture. 
Rather, he used a range of texts to illustrate his point and, in so doing implied 
that if this range of texts, which are considered part of Westem culture, can be 
described in terms of his seven types of ambiguity, then his concept of 
ambiguity must be valid. He further argued that if it was valid in this way, 
then the concept must be central to Western culture. Yet it is clear that this 
need not be the case -- just because something is describable in terms of a 
concept does not mean that that concept is central to that which is being 
described. 
^William Empson, Seven Types of Ambiguity: A Study of its Effects in English Verse 
(3rd ed. London: Chauo and Windus, 1977), p. viii. From this point all references to this 
text in this chapter will be enclosed in parentheses after the relevant quotation or reference. 
All italics are Empson's unless otherwise specified. 
Still, like Barthes, maybe Empson was rebelling, but against a concept of 
culture rather than of society, and the seven types of ambiguity were a means 
of providing "objective proof of deeply held beliefs about society - just as for 
Barthes the five codes were the means by which he hoped to break free from 
bourgeois criticism. So it is possible that the concept of ambiguity was the 
means by which Empson sought to free readers from pre-existing concepts of 
culture. But to make such an assumption at this point would be to pre-empt 
any analysis of Empson's work. 
One cannot help wondering which came first for Empson, the concept of 
ambiguity or the analysis of poetry using the concept of ambiguity? One could 
argue that the concept of ambiguity must have first occurred to him because it 
was being used by Leavis and Richards well before Empson linked it witii his 
method of analysing poetry. But on the other hand, Empson's use of the 
concept changes its meaning, so that although logically the concept has to 
precede any analysis, the concept can be changed by the method or the object 
of analysis in which it plays a role. If Empson's concept of ambiguity is not 
the only tool necessary for the analysis of poetry, and Empson indicated in his 
introduction to the work that this might be the case, then what is the role of 
Empson's concept of ambiguity in the analysis of poetry? In other words, 
how important a notion was it for Empson in his attempt to interpret poetry? 
I want to examine Empson's beliefs as to the nature of poetry, the 
reader's relationship with the work of art, how the reader is to know what was 
intended by the poet - or whether he considered this concept irrelevant when 
engaging in an act of criticism. My aim is to understand how these beliefs 
influenced Empson's criticism. In order to do this I need to examine how 
Empson characterised human relationships, to ascertain his relationship with 
the social mores of the time. I also want to determine whether Empson was 
attempting to rebel, like Barthes, against some dominant conception of society 
and culture, or whether he was trying to augment it. This issue appears to be 
relatively easy to separate from the technique of analysing poetry in terms of 
ambiguity and although I think that the concept of ambiguity indicates 
Empson's attitude towards the dominant culture of the time I intend to examine 
the two issues separately for the moment, although such an analysis in itself 
holds implications for a consideration of these issues. 
I. 
There is a tension between the "chaos" of the world and the "control" 
exercised by man evident in Empson's criticism. Similarly in Hartman's 
Criticism in the Wilderness^ one can note the tension between the creative 
nature of criticism and the implications of a creative criticism for the concept of 
scholarship. Hartman and Empson, unlike Barthes, both have too much 
sympathy for existing critical modes to reject them outright 
However, it is important for Empson's argument whether the control 
man may have over interpretation is exercised by author or reader. It is this 
question which remains confused in Seven Types of Ambiguity . It is clear 
that Empson is unsure both of whether the reader or author determines 
meaning, and of the ramifications of either view of interpretation. In order to 
understand how this can be the case an examination of Empson's use of the 
term ambiguity, and of the relationship between ambiguity, interpretation, and 
Empson's beliefs regarding the relationship between reader and author would 
be helpful. 
To talk of ambiguity is to beg several questions -- should one view 
ambiguity as intentional and if so, how can a reader know what the author of a 
work intended? Or does Empson think such knowledge irrelevant? Does a 
text have one meaning, or can a reader only know his/her interpretation of a 
text? From the outset Empson implies that interpretation is meaning - thus he 
analyses Shakespeare's line, "Bare ruined choirs, where late the sweet birds 
sang," in terms not only of meanings Shakespeare may have intended, but also 
^Geoffrey Hartman, Criticism in the Wilderness: The Study of Literature Today (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 19S0), passim. 
in terms of interpretations which enrich the line (see pp. 2-3). By arguing that 
an interpretation of a text is the meaning of that text, the next logical step is to 
conclude that it is the reader's interpretation which is the meaning of the text. 
But does this mean that the meaning is what the reader makes of the text, or 
what the author makes of it? There are two different senses of the term 
"making" being used here, and the distinction between them is very closely 
bound up with assumptions about the role of the author and of the reader of a 
text. The statement that interpretation is meaning can lend itself to a range of 
conclusions about the role of author and reader of a text and, as we shall see, 
throughout Seven Types of Ambiguity Empson toys with both notions. 
Part of the problem is a confusion between intention and illocution.'' 
Empson seems to assume that what the voice of a poem says is what the author 
believes, making little allowance for the realm of irony (except in the case of 
Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde). But this still does not explain the vacillation 
between the concept of meaning as that which the author intends versus 
meaning as that which the reader perceives.^ 
Jensen has some interesting conjectures on this point. I am largely in 
agreement with the broad outlines of his argument, but think that his contention 
that the seven types of ambiguity are arranged in decreasing grammatical 
disorder and increasing emphasis on the psychology of the author unjustified --
as I hope my argument indicates. 
What does Empson mean by "meaning"? We must have some 
understanding of the way in which Empson used the term in order to decide 
"'Roger Fowler, Review of William Empson: The Man and His Work, ed. Roma Gill, 
Language and Style. 10, No. 1 (1977), p. 69. 
^See James Jensen, "The Construction of Seven Types of Ambiguity Modern Language 
Quarterly, 27. No. 3 (1966). 
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whether his vacillation is deliberate. He seemed to insist that meaning is about 
what it is to be human and that a reader: 
must possess a fair amount of equilibrium or fairly strong 
defences; . . . must have the power first of reacting to a 
poem sensitively and definitely . . . and then, having fixed 
the reaction . . . must be able to turn the microscope on to 
it with a certain indifference . . . ; must be able to prevent 
their new feelings of the same sort from interfering with the 
process of understanding the original ones . . . and have 
enough detachment not to mind what their sources of 
satisfaction may torn out to be. (p. 247). 
In comparison, according to Harold Bloom it is the poet's defences 
against previous poets which are important, as are the critic's defences against 
previous critics. But it is unclear what role a critic's or reader's defences 
against poetry may play. Whereas for Empson the role of such defences is 
clear. 
For Empson reading is also an act of testing whether one can cope with 
oneself, for this is the major prerequisite for being able to deal with poetry, and 
for being a fit member of human society. More generally, he thought that 
"complexity of logical meaning ought to be based on complexity of 
thought . . . " (p. 49, my italics), a statement which implies that the 
responsibility for the meaning of a poem rests with the author, who has an 
obligation to ensure that s/he only uses complex poetical forms if his/her 
thought is sufficiently complex. How s/he is to decide what constitutes a 
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sufficient level of complexity is left unclear. A concomitant of the notion that 
the author is responsible for the meaning of a text is the view "that there is only 
one real meaning" for any given text, even an allegorical text (pp. 128-29).^ 
This belief is confirmed when Empson notes that "The meaning of an English 
sentence is largely decided by the a c c e n t . . . " (p. 147, my italics), and that 
it is one unified ('total') meaning which the author tries to convey. Yet he also 
thinks that the final range of associations is decided by the reader (see pp. 238-
39). 
Let us first consider the notion that the meaning of a poem is determined 
by the author, or that it is what the author wants us to think, for this seems to 
be the notion with which Empson began Seven Types of Ambiguity. At the 
outset Empson argued that "poetry has powerful means of imposing its own 
assumptions, and is very independent of the mental habits of the 
reader . . . " (p. 4). This attitude towards poetry is implied in several 
discussions of ambiguity in poetry (for example, his discussion of Peacock's 
War Song, which assumes a state of mind in Peacock (see p. 22)), and in 
discussions of the relevance of physiognomy in conversation -- for he believes 
that physiognomy supplements verbal statements, confirming the speaker's 
opinion as stated, providing a supplement for interpretation. The poem is seen 
as an expression of the author (see p. 49). As a consequence emendations are 
considered to be unwise, though sometimes revelatory of authorial intention --
thus his conjectures regarding the author of Promos and Cassandra 's 
intentions (see pp. 84-85) when he wrote: 
^That that "one real meaning" may be ambiguous, but its ambiguity is controlled by the 
author, was also noted by Christopher Norris, William Empson and the Philosophy of 
Literary Criticism (London: The Athlone Press, 1978), pp. 133-34. 
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PROMOS. So that the way is by severity 
Such wicked weedes even by the rootes to teare. 
(ii. 3.) (p. 84). 
In discussing a type of ambiguity Empson often tried to explain the 
device from the author's point of view (for example, his discussion of one 
common linguistic form in Shakespeare's poetry (see p. 90)), and saw certain 
types of ambiguity as deliberate, that is, as caused by an author. He 
considered the third type of ambiguity to be deliberate, as his discussion of the 
pun indicates, with its emphasis on the question of the "consciousness of a 
particular part o f . . . [the device of the pun]." (p. 103). Or, for that matter, 
his emphasis on the artificial, wrought nature of the pun, especially in the 
eighteenth century, where it is "always worldly" (p. 108). If the ambiguity is 
not deliberate, it is at least a reflection of what the author thought, even if s/he 
was confused as may occur in the fourth type (a.g.pp. 133ff); consider also the 
fifth type, when the author appears to create the ambiguity accidentally (see p. 
155). 
More generally, some appreciation of the author's attitude and knowledge 
was considered to be necessary for an understanding of the work, thus his 
comments on Ford's sonnet, "it is these associations which explain how that 
particular word [i.e. gall] came into his mind." (p. 156). It is the author who 
lays subdued conceits for the reader to discover, and Empson believed "that 
later English poetry is full of subdued conceits and ambiguities " (p. 
165). The reader does not invent such conceits for the poet (see p. 173), even 
if the author's opinion is not apparent, as is the case when someone is 
described as having eyes which " 'were a trifle large.' . . . Not knowing 
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how large the trifle may be, the reader has no means of being certain 
whether he would be charmed or appalled." (p. 176). In all cases the author is 
usually in control, s/he can create a sense of doubt in the mind of the reader, 
including doubt as to the opinion of the author, as is the case when the author 
asks a question to which the answer is both yes and no (see p. 182). And even 
if an ambiguity is not deliberate, it may reflect the author's state of mind, even 
if it is "evasive" and the author feels "that he will lose the attitude he is 
expressing if he looks at it too closely" (p. 190). Conflicts of motive are 
paralleled in language. ^ ^ 
As for the role of the reader in the discovery of ambiguity, Empson put in 
a claim for him/her early in the piece, and noted that the meaning of a poem is 
whatever the reader thinks it is, thus his comment on the word "ambiguity" 
itself, which he notes: 
can mean an indecision as to what you mean, an intention to 
mean several things, a probability that one or other or both of 
two things has been meant, and the fact that a statement has 
several meanings, (pp. 5-6). 
The onus here was placed on the reader by noting that the poem's 
atmosphere is given by the poet but interpreted by the reader. Because of this 
Empson feh that the reader needed some machinery to aid in the judgment of 
the poet's sincerity. ^ ^ 
10/Wd., pp. 123-24. 
p. 76. 
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All of this still seems to favour the notion that the meaning of a poem is 
to be considered as primarily determined by the author. But Empson often 
spoke of the meaning of eighteenth century verse as not being intended, let 
alone determined, by the poet, but still being the poem's meaning, thus he felt 
he could " . . . applaud them [i.e. the authors of eighteenth century verse] 
for qualities in their writings which they would have been horrified to 
discover." (p. 68). This would seem to imply that if the reader can make a 
case for an interpretation of a poem, then that is the poem's meaning - that is, 
the reader determines the meaning of a poem. This was stated even more 
baldly when Empson discussed ambiguity as though it existed only if noted by 
the reader, thus, "You notice the . . . following lines . . . " (p. 76, my 
italics). Empson's early discussion on puns confirms this emphasis, when he 
notes the importance of "questions of consciousness, of the direction of the 
reader's attention, of the interaction of separated parts of his mind " (p. 
102). So it would seem that it is the reader who ascribes meaning, even if the 
author disagrees. 
When writing in this vein Empson seems to be arguing that the reader 
ascribes meaning even if this results in a plethora of meanings, as often occurs 
when reading Shakespeare (see p. 138). Furthermore, in some instances 
Empson argued that an ambiguity may not be recognised as such by its author, 
or may simply be irrelevant to the thrust of the work, and yet be considered an 
ambiguity by the reader (see p. 184), implying that it is the reader who 
determines whether or not a statement is ambiguous. 
Although at first glance this emphasis on the role of the reader in 
Empson's writing may appear to be like Hartman's (at least, the later 
Hartman), their attitudes to the reader are quite dissimilar. For Empson the 
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reader supplements the text, whereas for Hartman s/he determines the text -
for Hartman the text is always a read document. In this Hartman is closer to 
Barthes than to Bloom or Empson. 
Simply by discussing the author's sincerity (for example, pp. 29-30) 
Empson appears to have given the author primacy in the determination of the 
meaning of a work. He expected the author to be sincere, that is, to express an 
emotion or state of mind which the reader can recognise as somehow "true" 
(see pp. 87, 125). It is on the author's sincerity that a reader is considered to 
be relying when determining the meaning of a poem. But it is to be noted that 
sincerity is an expectation that not every reader may share, and how is a reader 
who does not have such an expectation to understand the range of ambiguity 
intended by the author of a work? 
Furthermore, how can modem readers understand tiie intended ambiguity 
to be found in a text written in an earlier era? To presume that a dictionary 
can afford one an insight into the full range of ambiguities of a work is 
unjustified because a work relies upon a cultural milieu as, 1 suppose, Empson 
would have been the first to admit, and this milieu cannot be picked up from a 
dictionary. In general, Empson's position on the matter was that the reader's 
aim should be to re-create the author's meaning by re-imagining the poem, for 
"the process of getting to understand a poet is precisely that of constructing his 
poems in one's own mind." (p. 62). Yet he leaves unclear whether the result 
was to be considered the meaning the author or the reader intended. However, 
he did note "that the English language makes them [i.e. ambiguities] difficult to 
avoid . . . " (p. 80), leaving one wondering how a reader is to discover 
whether an ambiguity is deliberate or accidental, and whether such a distinction 
matters anyway. 
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In discussing an ambiguity of the third type Empson did not thoroughly 
examine what roles the reader and the author can be said to play in the 
determination of meaning, though it is apparent that he considered both to be 
playing some role. His discussion of the use of the third type of ambiguity as 
a weapon by such poets as Donne (see p. 124) implied that both the author and 
the reader must know what the work means, and the way in which ambiguity 
is being used. More generally, William Empson considered the author's use of 
ambiguity to stimulate "the reader's judgment by leaving aa apparently 
unresolved duality in his own . . . " (p. 125). And yet he also thought that a 
reader should not allow him/herself the luxury of a range of possible meanings 
when it was likely that not all the alternatives were intended, thus something 
that was "not an Elizabethan idiom . . . " should not be considered relevant 
in an examination of Shakespeare's poetry (p. 136). On the other hand, 
Empson considered the sixth type of ambiguity, although deliberate, to have 
meanings the reader gives it (e.g. pp. 178-80). 
Generally Empson seemed to believe that the author of a work creates a 
range of meanings and sets the boundaries within which the statements s/he 
makes are to be interpreted, but that the reader may occasionally interpret from 
outside these boundaries if it results in a more satisfactory (however defined) 
reading - though criteria for determining what is to the good of the poem are 
not forthcoming. This is rather reminiscent of a humanists approach to the 
legal system -- it is to be abided with unless it is manifestly unjust 
(unsatisfactory), upon which it is to be changed -- initially by custom. This 
indeterminacy as to how meaning is formulated allowed Empson to claim that 
his seven types of ambiguity provided a machinery for interpreting poetry 
without forcing him to specify what may be admitted as evidence in the 
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formulation of an interpretation of a poem. By setting up a "mechanics" of 
interpretation Empson could claim that his methods were more objective and 
scientific than those of other critics. And yet, as is clear, despite the 
"mechanics" there is quite some confusion regarding how one can and should 
read and interpret poetry. 
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II. 
The central confusion regarding the role of the author and of the reader in 
the determination of meaning mirrors Empson's indeterminate stance regarding 
the individual's (and, for that matter, his own) relationship with society. The 
concept of ambiguity in poetry can be seen as a metaphor for the ambiguity in 
Empson's own discussions of the relationship between author and reader, 
between individuals. 
In The Structure of Complex Words Empson developed an outwardly 
mechanical, and therefore "objective" method of classifying the import of 
words by sense (i.e. connotation), appreciative of depreciative pregnancy, 
mood, feeling, and so on.^^ At first it might appear that the underlying flaw in 
such a system lies in the belief that a system of classification is required in 
order to engage in an act of interpretation. But such a system is designed to 
encourage the reader to believe that s/he has discovered a rational approach to 
understanding fiction, to understanding the world and hinVherself, rather than 
a subjective approach. Thus the reader is encouraged to share Empson's 
opinions under the guise of accepting a "rational" approach to poetry, and to 
life. There is something psychologically comforting in having convinced 
others to see the world as one does -- it implies both that one is normal (others 
share your vision), and better than normal (one has vision, others share it). 
Similarly, in Some Versions of Pastoral Empson developed his notions 
of a full and normal life, the role of the poet in society, in short, his vision of 
society, under the guise of developing a rational explanation for the genre of 
12see William Empson's The Structure of Complex Words (London: Chatto and Windus, 
1951), pp. 15ff. 
19 
p a s t o r a l i n E n g l i s h v e r s e . And in Milton's God Empson often appealed to 
history to justify what could be called a psychologistic approach to Milton's 
Paradise Lost. 
It is by piecing together the major points of his arguments in these three 
books and comparing them with those proffered in Seven Types of Ambiguity 
that some understanding of Empson's view of what it is to be human and to 
live in society, as well as what structure should underpin society, can be 
gained. An important clue to Empson's attitude is his characterisation of the 
relationship between reader, poet, and poem which, as we have already noted, 
is by no means unambiguous. Empson seemed to assume that a poem exists 
because its author had something s/he wanted to communicate, that to 
understand poetry one must understand the motives underlying its creation, 
that there must be some sort of rapport between the reader and the author of a 
work, and that the intentions of the author of a work can be found in the play 
of attitudes manifest in that work.^^ What I hope my analysis has thus far 
shown is that Empson found in the course of writing Seven Types of 
Ambiguity that "problems as to communication" were not irrelevant, as he 
had claimed at the outset, but in fact unavoidable, and at the heart of his attempt 
to formulate a vision of humanity. 
Empson declared that "The object of life . . . is not to understand 
things, but to maintain one's defences and equilibrium and live as well as one 
can " (p. 247). For the author, then, the poem is primarily a way of 
keeping him/herself sane, writing about that which s/he fears in order to 
13see Empson's Some Versions of Pastoral (London: Chatto and Windus, 1935), pp. 1 Iff , 
114-15. 
l^See Norris, William Empson and the Philosophy of Literary Criticism, op. at., pp. 66, 
68-69, 134. 
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exorcise that fear, or a means of enjoyment and self-expression. Similar 
reasons can be found for why a reader bothers to read poetry, or to write about 
it. Thus poetry, which exemplifies human values, also reinforces them. 
Perhaps that is also why critics criticise poetry -- in order to maintain 
sanity (humanity). One develops a system of criticism, say, the machinery of 
ambiguity, in order to impose humanity on the apparently chaotic range of 
possible interpretations of poetry. The implication can be found in Empson's 
choice of subtitle for the work. One can discuss the effects of ambiguity just 
as one can discuss the effects of a disease, or of a medicine. Occasionally 
Empsonidiscussion of ambiguity implied that it was something which enabled 
one to control the range of meanings to be taken note of when reading poetry, 
something which limits one's attention to what is "relevant" (see pp. 1 ,6 ) - -
that is, to what reinforces a particular vision of humanity. Ambiguity is the 
medicine for the disease of meaning. This view may be contrasted with that of 
Geoffrey Hartman and other deconstructionists, who argue against imposing 
order on texts and instead in favour of free play with texts, in favour of a 
creative criticism which delights in the range of interpretations available for any 
given work. For deconstructive critics the limiting of a text's meaning is one 
of the "problems" of New Criticism, which is seen as stultifying and limiting 
the role of the critic. Whereas for Empson limiting the range of meaning of a 
work was a means by which the role of the critic may be defined.^^ 
By comparison, two fundamentally different appreciations of how to 
cope with one's humanity are contrasted in Poetry and Repression. Bloom 
argues that a poet writes in order to cope with and attempt to exorcise the 
l^in other words, I disagree with Culler who argues that Empson shows that reference to 
context does not limit the range of possible meanings of a text - see Jonathon Culler, 
Framing the Sign: Criticism and its Institutions (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 93. 
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anxiety of influence brought on by the existence of precursor poets. Similarly, 
he argues that critics write criticism at least partly in order to deal with the 
anxiety of influence brought on by the existence of precursor critics. The 
major difference between Bloom and Empson is that for Bloom language is a 
battlefield, whereas for Empson it is a hospital. 
According to Empson the role of the critic is to work out why a poem is 
good and explain this to the reader, for "the reasons that make a line of verse 
likely to give pleasure, I believe, are like the reasons for anything else; one can 
reason about t h e m . . . . " (p. 9). So the critic may apply such maxims as " 
'the sound must be an echo to the sense' . . . " (p. 10) and explain these. 
Generally "he must concentrate on the whole of the poem he is talking about 
rather than on the particular things he can find to say." (p. 17), pointing out the 
importance of the atmosphere of the poem, which can be described as the 
consciousness of what is implied by the meaning (e.g. pp. 117-18). Indeed, 
Empson's vision of the ideal critic comes to seem more and more like that of a 
Super-reader, with Johnsonian good sense (see p. 123) and the ability to 
extract from a poem "what it [i.e. the public] wants; to organise, what he may 
indeed create, the taste of his period." (p. 245). This is what Empson was 
trying to do, to create the taste of his period. He also saw the critic as 
explaining what the poem means to a more ignorant public, it is s/he who can 
tell the reader what the "correct line" is in relation to a work, and thus in 
relation to him/herself. 
But one is not a critic if one does not also feel the emotions the poem was 
intended to arouse. The critic "must convince the reader that he knows what he 
is talking about (that he has had the experience which is in ques t i on ) . . . " 
(p. 249). The general argument is that the critic must be capable of 
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sympathising with the poem, because "unless you are enjoying the poetry you 
cannot create it, as poetry, in your mind." (p. 248), and therefore, presumably, 
cannot fairly criticise it. But how this re-creation is to take place, in what ways 
it must be like the creation of the poem for one to judge whether a reader has 
accurately, or at least adequately, understood the author, is left unclear. The 
critic must not only analyse, that is, assume "that something has been 
conveyed to the reader by the work under considerat ion 
and . . . [set] . . . out to explain, in terms of the rest of the reader's 
experience, why the work has had the effect on him that is assumed." (p. 249). 
The critic must also appreciate the poem, which involves showing "that he has 
had the experience . . . in question . . . " (p. 249) and indicating "which 
of the separate parts of the experience he is talking about, after he has separated 
them " (p. 249). 
So Empson's criticism can also be seen as an attempt to convince other 
critics, other readers, to use his methods, to become the type of critic he claims 
to be, to share his taste, his opinions. And rather than simply attempt to 
convince the reader that he was right, Empson chose to convince the reader that 
he was rational, an attribute to be valued in a humanistic society. In writing 
Seven Types of Ambiguity Empson told the story of a sensitive man, 
conscious of the aims of poets, the inadequacies of readers, the need for a 
vision of humanity in order to come to grips with the worid, to maintain one's 
sanity, to be human. 
Empson's approach to criticism is not value free. Given that the decision 
to classify an ambiguity as deliberate or accidental may vary from reader to 
reader, by considering pieces of poetry as exemplifying particular types of 
ambiguity Empson also makes judgme/^+^ regarding the quality of the poetry. 
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These, however, are not displayed as value judgjnrionts, but claimed to be the 
result of an impartial analysis of poetry in terms of his seven types of 
ambiguity. 
So Empson's seven types of ambiguity, far from being an innocuous 
piece of machinery designed to aid the reader in his/her interpretation of texts, 
are in fact part of a method of criticism designed to limit the range of meaning 
of any text, and to encourage the reader to think as Empson did. They are a 
means of defining the role of the critic, situating him/her in relation to 
literature. Empson's criticism is not simply an act of keeping oneself "sane" in 
the face of literature, but making sure others share one's "sanity". 
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III. 
What kind of sanity is it that would categorise ambiguity into seven types 
~ reminiscent of the seven deadly sins, the four humours, or, for that matter, 
the ten commandments?'^ Just how does Empson categorise such an 
amorphous concept as "ambiguity" and what does that tell us about Empson's 
beliefs regarding reading and the relationship between writers and readers? 
In fact, if one examines Seven Types of Ambiguity closely it soon 
becomes apparent that there are more than seven types of ambiguity. The 
following list of types of ambiguity is my attempt at sorting out how many 
ambiguities Empson noted and how they are related. Just how the machinery 
of ambiguity is used to situate the author, the reader, and the critic should 
become apparent from this analysis. 
Let us begin by recalling Empson's definition of the word "ambiguity": 
"any verbal nuance, however slight, which gives room for alternative reactions 
to the same piece of language." (p. 1). It "can mean an indecision as to what 
you mean, an intention to mean several things, probability that one or other or 
both of two things has been meant, and the fact that a statement has several 
meanings." (pp. 5-6). He also noted that there are three possible scales for 
ambiguity: 
(1) that of "logical or grammatical disorder," in which he was interested; 
(2) "the degree to which the apprehension of the ambiguity must be 
conscious"; and 
l^Geoffrey Hartman, "Monsieur Texte: On Jacques Derrida, his Glas." Georgia Review 
(Winter 1975), p. 782 
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(3) "the degree of psychological complexity . . . " (p. 48). 
It is worth comparing this concept of ambiguity with the Barthesian 
notion of the plurality of the text. For Barthes the concept of plurality is the 
opening through which altemative interpretations to those relying on bourgeois 
notions can be made. In other words, the concept of plurality is seen as 
allowing for a different vision of society, a different approach to life, not 
involved with bourgeois concerns. In comparison Empson ties the concept of 
ambiguity more closely to one's apprehension of the text. Both critics are 
concerned with the way in which analytical tools can both neglect and coerce 
opinions (of texts, of society). But Barthes focusses on the way in which 
analysis influences social mores, whereas Empson is concerned with the way 
in which analysis influences aesthetic and psychological mores. 
A close examination of Empson's descriptions of the seven types of 
ambiguity and the way in which he uses them is necessary in order to come to 
some understanding of Empson's conception of the mind. The seven types of 
ambiguity may be oudined as follows. 
The first type of ambiguity occurs when: 
One thing is said to be like another, and they have several 
different properties in virtue of which they are 
alike . . . [or when] a word or grammatical structure is 
effective in several ways at once. (p. 2) 
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This definition, he admitted, was so broad it covered almost everything. 
The first type of ambiguity can be "the comparison of two things which does 
not say in virtue of what they are to be compared" (p. 21). The example 
Empson gave was of Macbeth using the word "rook" instead of "crow" to 
evoke an atmosphere of death (see pp. 18-19). Let us, for convenience sake, 
number the types of ambiguity. This is ambiguity of the kind 1,1. 
The first type of ambiguity can also involve "the omamental use of false 
antithesis, which places words as if in opposition to one another without 
saying in virtue of what they are to be opposed" (p. 22). In this instance 
Peacock's War Song is quoted, and Empson points out that the last line of the 
couplet, "The heroes and the cravens, / The spearmen and the bowmen" makes 
a distinction which seems irrelevant to the image he is trying to create (type 1, 
II). 
Another way in which the first type of ambiguity may be manifest is "the 
use of a comparative adjective which does not say what its noun is to be 
compared with . . . " (p. 23). This is the final instance given of the first 
type of ambiguity (type 1, III). 
This simple type of ambiguity may be intended by the author but often 
appears to be incomplete or inadequate -- as in the Peacock example. The 
author has given the reader a broad base from which to speculate regarding 
intended meanings (1,1) or has created a "hanging" comparison (1, II and 1, 
III). 
The second type of ambiguity "occurs when two or more meanings are 
resolved into one" (p. 48). This type can be subdivided into instances where 
these separate meanings, once understood, "remain an intelligible unit in the 
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mind" (p. 57), and instances where it is enjoyable to work out the separate 
meanings, and to a certain extent one must do so each time one re-reads the 
passage containing them (see p. 57). However, since these are essentially 
similar types of ambiguity I have labelled them 2,1, a and b respectively. 
The second type of ambiguity can also involve ambiguity used to give 
fluidity to verse. Empson gives the following example from Shakespeare's 
sonnets: 
But heaven in thy creation did decree 
That in thy face sweet love should ever dwell, 
Whate'er thy thoughts or thy heart's workings be. 
Thy looks should nothing thence, but sweetness tell, 
(xciii.) (p. 50) 
Empson points out that each phrase can go with either the sentence before 
or after (type 2, II). This type of ambiguity establishes resolution or union of 
concepts as another important attribute of the mind. 
"An ambiguity of the third type . . . occurs when two ideas, which are 
connected only by being both relevant in the context, can be given in one word 
simultaneously. This is often done by reference to derivation . . . " (p. 
102). In this manner the reader is forced to be aware of the two meanings of 
the one word. It is a conscious device. 
Puns may be classed as examples of the third type of ambiguity. For 
example: 
28 
Ye, who appointed stand, 
Do as you have in charge, and briefly touch 
What we propound, and loud that all may hear. 
(Paradise Lost, vi. 565.) (p. 103). 
Here, Empson argued, one must concentrate on the ingenuity involved and the 
way in which the words are probably being interpreted by the gunners and by 
the angels, who have not encountered artillery before (type 3,1). 
The third type of ambiguity may also involve a single statement that is 
made which implies other situations to which it is relevant ~ for example, an 
allegory "which is felt to have many levels of interpretation" (p. 112) (type 3, 
II). It may also involve a description of two situations, leaving it to the reader 
to infer the facts of both and how they are mutually illustrative, for example: 
for so work the honey-bees . . . 
They have a king, and officers of so r t s ; . . . 
Others, like soldiers, armed in their stings. 
Make boot upon the summer's velvet buds; 
Which pillage they with merry march bring home. 
To the tent-royal of their emperor. 
Who, busied in his majesty, surveys 
The singing masons building roofs of gold; 
The civil citizens kneading up the honey; 
{Henry V. , I. ii. 320) (p. 112) 
This type of ambiguity I will call type 3, III to distinguish it from allegory. 
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There is yet another instance of the third type of ambiguity. This occurs 
when one: 
talks about one thing and implies several ways of judging or 
feeling about it. This tends to be less rational and self-
conscious . . . more dramatic and more aware of the 
complexities of human j u d ^ e n t . (p. 125). 
Empson's example is from Pope's Epistle to Dr Arbuthnot: 
who, high in Drury Lane, 
Lulled by soft zephyrs through the broken pane. 
Rhymes e'er he wakes, and prints before term ends, 
ObUged by hunger, and request of friends, 
(p. 125). 
Empson asks whether Pope is sneering at or justifying the rhymer. This type 
of ambiguity establishes the ability to make connections, to recognise 
references, as important. 
"An ambiguity of the fourth type occurs when two or more meanings of a 
statement do not agree among themselves, but combine to make clear a more 
complicated state of mind in the author." (p. 133). The subtlety may be great, 
as in the third type, but it is not the main focus of consciousness. Empson 
provides the following example to clarify the distinction: 
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I never thought that you did painting need, 
And therefore to your fair no painting set, 
I found (or thought I found) you did exceed. 
The barren tender of a Poet's debt: 
And therefore have I slept in your report. 
That you yourself being extant well might show, 
How far a modem quill doth come too short. 
Speaking of worth, what worth in you doth grow. 
This silence for my sin you did impute, 
Which shall be most my glory being dumb, 
For I impair not beauty, being mute, 
When others would give life, and bring a tomb. 
There lives more Hfe in one of your fair eyes, 
Than both your Poets can in praise devise. 
{Sonnets, Ixxxiii) (p. 133). 
The focus, he argues, is on the emotion rather than the subtlety used to 
express it. This type of ambiguity is regarded as focussing attention one one's 
ability to recognise a situation in all its complexity (type 4). 
The fifth type of ambiguity "occurs when the author is discovering his 
idea in the act of writing, or not holding it all in his mind at once . . . " (p. 
155). It is not regarded as subtle, unlike the third type of ambiguity, but rather 
as a stock literary device, thus: 
Our Natures do pursue 
Like Rats that ravyn downe their proper Bane 
A thirsty evil, and when we drinke we die. 
{Measure for Measure, I. ii.) (p. 155) 
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Shakespeare's lines are considered but a refined version of a device which in 
less accomplished hands "obscures the matter in hand unnecessarily . . . " 
(p. 160) (type 5). 
The sixth type of ambiguity; 
occurs when a statement says nothing, by tautology, by 
contradiction, or by irrelevant statements; so that the reader is 
forced to invent statements of his own and they are liable to 
conflict with one another, (p. 176). 
For example, the statement, "Zuleika Dobson was not stricdy beautiful" is 
described as leaving one wondering whether she was really commonplace, or 
handsome, or unusual in some fashion (see p. 176). This type of ambiguity is 
considered to have many manifestations, and it gives the reader a limited 
opportunity to use his/her imagination in order to understand the situation 
described. 
The sixth type of ambiguity can involve quite complex cases, where "the 
reader is not so much conscious of the contradiction as of the way it fails so as 
to have meaning" (p. 178) (type 6, I, a), or more simple instances when a 
"generalization which is added to show the force of the antithesis makes it a 
false one" (p. 179) (type 6,1, b). Alternatively, it may be a case of an illogical 
antithesis, forcing a double meaning onto the two key words of the antithesis 
(p. 180). 
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An author can also "ask a question whose answer is both yes and 
n o . . . " (p. 182). I have labelled this an ambiguity of type 6, II, a. 
Empson's example is the Lady of Shallot who, in posing questions "whose 
answer is both yes and no", acts without being seen to do so: 
But who hath seen her wave her hand? 
Or at the casement seen her stand? 
Or is she known in all the land, 
TheLadyofShaUott? 
(p. 182). 
The Lady of Shallot is both known and unknown. And it is this uncertain 
status that adds to the complexity of the situation the poet outiines. 
Related to this type of ambiguity is that which occurs by tautology. 
According to Empson: 
there will be a pun which is used twice, once in each sense, 
and the massive fog of the complete ambiguity will then arise 
from a doubt as to which meaning goes with which word, 
(pp. 182-83). 
Empson's example is from Herbert's Affliction: 
Yet though thou troublest me, I must be meek; 
In weakness must be stout. 
33 
Well, I will change the service, and go seek 
Some other master out. 
Ah, my dear God, though I am clean forgot. 
Let me not love thee, if I love thee not. 
(p. 183). 
Empson's considers the last line to be an ambiguity by tautology, playing off 
notions of present and future love (pp. 183-84) (type 6,1, b). 
Another related type of ambiguity is that which occurs as a result of 
irrelevant statements. This type of ambiguity is close to both the first and the 
seventh type of ambiguity: 
It is not merely a statement with various 
implications . . . which conflict; nor is it an essential 
contradiction, but a contradiction on matters not central to the 
writer's interests at the moment, or a contradiction which is 
thought of as capable of being resolved. Like the first type it 
may be hunted among similes, (p. 184). 
Empson's example is from Pope's Dunciad: 
Then rose the seed of Chaos, and of Night, 
To blot out order, and extinguish light, 
Of dull and venal a new world to mould. 
And bring Satumian days of lead and gold. 
(POPE, Dunciad.) 
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The Saturnian was the Golden Age; Saturn was lead in 
astrology. Gold is intended to have the two sorts of 
meaning I have suggested, so that this is a fair example of the 
sixth type, in a very simple form. Evidently the contradiction 
is capable of being resolved; it is resolved into a joke. (p. 
185). 
This more complex type of ambiguity is designed to reflect an evasive 
state of mind, to show that lack of resolution is as human an activity as 
resolution of conflict. 
The seventh type of ambiguity: 
is the most ambiguous that can be conceived, [and] occurs 
when the two meanings of the word, the two values of the 
ambiguity, are the two opposite meanings defined by the 
context, so that the total effect is to show a fundamental 
division in the writer's mind. (p. 192). 
This can "convey an impression of conscious ornamentation . . . " by 
having two things exacdy the same opposing each other, so one is drawn into a 
stasis of appreciation (see pp. 192-93). The contradiction may be meant to be 
resolved in one of two ways: "corresponding to thought and feeling" (type 7, 
I, a, i), or "corresponding to knowing and knowing one's way about the 
matter in hand" (type 7,1, a, ii) (p. 196). 
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Alternatively, this type of ambiguity may involve two statements which 
are very different, fitted together with ingenuity (type 7, II, a), or two 
statements which are alike, expressing the need for and difficulty of their 
separation (type 7, II, b) (see p. 196). The former is usually resolved by an 
ambiguity of type 7,1, a, i, and the latter by an ambiguity of type 7,1, a, ii. 
Finally, the original contradiction may be resolved into an indefinite 
number of contradictions, in which case the reader may extract those meanings 
which s/he finds useful, and ignore others (type 7, III) (p. 197). 
It can be argued that Empson's machinery of ambiguity, however it may 
be typified (certainly we can distinguish more than just seven types), works to 
establish the importance of key critical skills -- interpretation (choosing from 
many possible meanings), synthesis of ideas, recognition of the full 
complexity of a text or of standard cliched references used by authors. The 
critic is considered to be in a position to determine whether a section of a text is 
complex but its meanings are resolved or complex and unresolvable. 
While Barthes' criticism acted upon a particular society and focussed 
upon reading texts in a different way as a means of undermining that society (a 
focus on how people act), Empson's criticism, like Bloom's, is based on a 
particular conception of how people think, and his criticism is a means of 
reinforcing that conception. It is for this reason that Richards' concept of Pure 
Sound would have been so foreign to Empson, for it indicates a kind of 
reasoning which Empson did not regard as indicative of a human mind, but 
instead appealing to the "animal" within. 
It is worth comparing Empson's claims to those of Harold Bloom. 
Harold Bloom openly acknowledges that his work is an attempt to come to 
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terms with both previous criticism and poetry, and argues that the way to do 
this is to make the previous work appear belated, and thus dependent upon 
what one writes, so that one's own criticism in effect becomes the forerunner 
to both the preceding poetry and criticism under consideration.^^ There is a 
strong competitive streak in Harold Bloom's attitude towards criticism, with 
his insistence that each strong critic is trying to prove that s/he was "there" 
first. This is not apparent in the criticism of William Empson. Empson's 
troping of such predecessor critics as I. A. Richards emphasises his desire to 
encourage others to share his understanding of the human mind. The story he 
tells of poetry is that of guerilla warfare between the reader and language, the 
reader trying to pin poetry down, but the poem being written or possibly the 
nature of language being such that evasive action has akeady been undertaken. 
And this evasive action is characterised as ambiguity. This story mirrors a 
larger drama, that of the relationship between man and the world in which he 
finds himself. For Bloom, Empson and Barthes, writing is a polemical act -
an attempt to promulgate a personal vision. But the degree to which this is 
consciously recognised in each critic's criticism varies. Barthes is openly 
polemical, whereas Empson disguises his views under a general discussion of 
ambiguity in poetry. 
Barthes developed his approach to "Sarrasine" in order to counter the 
emphasis on unity of the text (its "plan") that he found in French criticism, 
an emphasis on unity which was seen as symptomatic of a bourgeois vision of 
society. Similarly, Empson's criticism developed as a reaction to those critics 
who argued that what mattered in poetry was not the meaning, but the Pure 
I'^See Harold Bloom, Poetry and Repression: Revisionism from Blake to Stevens (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976), passim, and also my chapter discussing 
this work. 
ISRoland Barthes, SfZ.. trans. Richard Miller (London: Jonathon Cape, 1974), p. 90. 
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Sound, or the Atmosphere (see p. 8), though this cannot be construed as 
prima facie evidence of a desire to expound a different view of culture or 
society. Empson, like Barthes, assumed that a text is a construct, and asked: 
"Why has it been constructed in this fashion?" However, in focussing on the 
text as construct the problem of knowing whether it was deliberately 
constructed in the way it is describable as being constructed is pushed to one 
side. For Barthes, of course, this was a relatively minor problem for he was 
interested in texts from the point of view of the reader, trying to ascertain the 
extent to which texts can be seen as reinforcing the readers' complicity with 
bourgeois society. Furthermore, Barthes'desire to closely examine one text 
indicates a fundamental difference in approach. For Barthes elucidates his 
theories using one text and then argues that these theories can and do apply to 
any text, whereas Empson elucidated his theory of ambiguity using a range of 
texts and then argued that the concept of ambiguity could be considered central 
to Western poetry. 
In this way Empson could avoid dealing with the problem of how one 
can determine in what ways a text was constructed (that is, how deliberately it 
was developed). In doing this Empson blurred the distinction between his 
version of a text and the notion of an authoritative (author's) version. This 
enabled him to slide over the question of the extent to which one can know an 
author's intention from reading a text. 
Whilst Empson claimed that the machinery of ambiguity enables the 
reader to determine what an author meant, in practice Empson never explained 
how one can know an author's intention. It is not surprising that Empson 
failed to do this -- it's not possible! This failure does not detract from 
Empson's aesthetics, from his particular comments about particular poems. 
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While the machinery of ambiguity may be judged a failure as a means of 
unifying disparate local observations it does not rob those observations of their 
strength or relevance. 
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Roland Barthes' SIZ. 
One of the central myths of structuralism is that texts, works of art, any 
object, can be fully described by focussing on form, on structure. Thus in 
Foucault's work we can find a text focussed on the form of a prison 
{Discipline and Punish ), or one on the structures society built to contain 
insanity {Madness and Civilisation ). Hindsight is a strong ally, and any 
structuralist interpretation (especially of cultural institutions) should be 
carefully examined. It is easy to create a structure where either none or a 
different structure exists by leaving out "minor" details as unworthy of 
attention. The same texts or institutions may support many different 
structures, each of which is only partially explanatory. Structuralism was 
popular with anti-bourgeois academics and others in the 1960s in part because 
it provided an opportunity to re-evaluate existing texts and institutions, to 
reclaim them from bourgeois society. 
In SIZ Barthes focusses on a machinery of criticism (just as Empson 
used the machinery of ambiguity) in order to present a mode of interpretation 
that involves the reader as (co-) producer of texts rather than as passive 
consumer of them. The machinery of the five codes, like that of the seven 
types of ambiguity, is used to legitimise personal beliefs. These beUefs may be 
separated from the codes, whose critical function can be assessed in the same 
way that I assessed Empson's machinery of ambiguity. In this chapter I will 
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examine both Barthes' codes and the beliefs he sought to justify in order to 
understand how he characterised criticism and its function within society. 
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I . 
Barthes' machinery of analysis consists of dividing the text into lexias 
and categorising these lexias by code. In order to understand how Barthes 
uses these codes and what they offer as critical tools we must first begin by 
noting what they are and how they are used. Barthes' five codes are: the 
hermeneutic code, or Voice of Truth, under which are listed "the various 
(formal) terms by which the enigma can be distinguished,- suggested, 
formulated, held in suspense, and finally disclosed . . . (p. 19); the 
semic code, or the Voice of the Person - "the signifier par excellence because 
of its connotation " (p. 17), indicated without formal grouping so that it 
is unstable and not linked to a specific character or object (see p. 19); the 
symbolic code, or Voice of the Symbol, indicating a symbolic area, also 
structured to ensure multivalence and reversibility (that is, to ensure that one 
can enter the discourse at any stage) (see also p. 19); the code of actions -- the 
proairetic code, or the Voice of Empirics -- is a listing of the actions, and "the 
result of an artifice of reading: whoever reads the text amasses certain data 
under some generic ntles for actions . . . [each] title embodies the 
sequence . . . " since each sequence can be named and "its basis is therefore 
more empirical than r a t i ona l . . . " (p. 19); and finally the cultural codes, or 
the Voice of Science,^^ which refers "to a science or a body of 
knowledge . . . ." (p. 20). 
19Roland Barthes, 5/Z, Trans. Richard Miller. (London: Jonathon Cape, 1974), p. 19. 
From this point all references to this text in this chapter will be enclosed in parentheses after 
the relevant quotation or reference. All italics are Empson's unless otherwise specified. 
20Ruth Gross argues that this is a mistranslaUon, and should read "The Voice of 
Knowledge." See "Rich TextyPoor Text: A Kafkan Confusion," PMLA , 95 (1980), p. 169. 
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Barthes admits that his division of the text into lexias is "arbitrary in the 
ex t reme, . . . imply[ing] no methodological responsibility, since . . . [this 
division] will bear solely on the signifier, whereas the proposed analysis bears 
solely on the signified." (p. 13). In effect he is admitting that other readings of 
"Sarrasine" using his method are still possible, although probably to a limited 
extent. Different people may divide the text in a different fashion, and thus 
notice the existence of a code in a passage which Barthes has not noted. 
There are several questions raised by the invention of such a system of 
analysis: is there any overlap between the codes, and if so is this good or bad? 
Making allowances for the extremely close analysis, does Barthes reveal 
anything about the text which a bourgeois critic or a New Critical explication, 
say, would not reveal? Or, for that matter, could a New Critical explication 
reveal anything about the text which Barthes' approach cannot? 
The first question that springs to mind is: given the emphasis that Barthes 
places on the lack of structure within and amongst these codes, would one 
expect them to be most apparent at what other (classic) critics would refer to as 
the climaxes of the text -- that is, the points at which questions raised by the 
plot are answered by some series of events (for example, when Sarrasine 
discovers La Zambinella is not female)? Would the frequency of appearance of 
each code be somehow related? In other words, would there be a crescendo of 
code occurrences leading to a climax of the text's apparent failure to cope with 
its subject matter? (However, by this appearance the text does in fact cope 
with itself). And yet would Barthes consider this concept to be too allied with 
the bourgeois notions of unity? Is this what Barthes would want his codes to 
display, given his emphasis on the text not as one tale nested within another, 
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without connection, but as a structure of two related tales related by 
hermeneutic, semic, and proairetic codes? 
In order to examine the first aspect of this issue let us choose a climax, a 
point at which questions posed by several codes are answered in the story,and 
note the frequency with which each code is noted during the climax. Consider 
the section in which it is revealed to Sarrasine by Prince Chigi that La 
Zambinella is not a woman, but a castrato: 
"She? What she?" asked the old nobleman to whom 
Sarrasine had been speaking. "La Zambinella." "La 
Zambinella!" the Roman Prince replied. "Are you joking? 
Where are you from? Has there ever been a woman on the 
Roman stage? And don't you know about the creatures who 
sing female roles in the Papal States? I am the one, 
monsieur, who gave Zambinella his voice. I paid for 
everything that scamp ever had, even his singing teacher. 
Well, he has so little gratitude for the service I rendered him 
that he has never consented to set foot in my house. And 
yet, if he makes a fortune, he will owe it all to me." 
Prince Chigi may well have gone on talking for some 
time; Sarrasine was not listening to him. A horrid truth had 
crept into his soul. It was as though he had been struck by 
lightning. He stood motionless, his eyes fixed on the false 
singer. His fiery gaze exerted a sort of magnetic influence on 
Zambinella, for the musico finally turned to look at 
Sarrasine, and at that moment his heavenly voice faltered. 
He trembled! An involuntary murmur escaping the audience 
he had kept hanging on his lips completed his discomfiture; 
he sat down and cut short his aria. 
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Cardinal Cicognara, who had glanced out of the comer of 
his eye to see what had attracted his protege's attention, then 
saw the Frenchman: he leaned over to one of his 
ecclesiastical aides-de-camp and appeared to be asking the 
sculptor's name. Having obtained the answer he sought, he 
regarded the artist with great attention and gave an order to an 
abbe, who quickly disappeared, (p. 250). 
According to Barthes this section of the text has seventeen'lexias. The 
hermeneutic code is noted five times, each time in relation to Enigma 6 (Who is 
La Zambinella?); the symbolic code only once (but twice for one instance: 
being the "Axis of the sexes" and "castration"); the semic code twice (in 
relation to stardom); the referential code also twice (reference to the history of 
music in the Papal states, and to Italianness); and the proairetic code ten times 
(in reference to "Incident", "Danger", and "Murder") (see pp. 184-90). It 
might be tempting to assume that there is a direct relationship between a climax 
and the frequency of occurrence of the hermeneutic and proairetic codes, and 
an inverse relationship with the frequency of occurrence of the symbolic, 
semic, and referential codes. But before drawing such a conclusion let us 
consider another climax. 
Sarrasine sat down before the terrified singer. Two huge 
tears welled from his dry eyes, rolled down his manly 
cheeks, and fell to the ground: two tears of rage, two bitter 
and burning tears. 
"No more love! I am dead to all pleasure, to every human 
emotion." 
45 
So saying he seized a hammer and hurled it at the statue 
with such extraordinary force that he missed it. He thought 
he had destroyed this monument to his folly, and then took 
up his sword and brandished it to kill the singer. Zambinella 
uttered piercing screams. At that moment, three men entered 
and at once the sculptor fell, stabbed by three stilleto thrusts. 
"On behalf of Cardinal Cicognara," one of them said. 
"It is a good deed worthy of a Christian," replied the 
Frenchman as he died. (pp. 252-53). 
A section containing ten lexias, according to Barthes. The hermeneutic 
code is not noted; the symbolic code is recorded twice ("contagion of 
castration" and "replication of bodies"); the semic code is also not noted; the 
referential code is noted once (code of Tears); and the proairetic code twelve 
times (several times twice for the same lexia. The terms recorded are: will-to-
die, statue, threat, murder) (pp. 202-205). Clearly the hypothesis that there is 
a direct relationship between climax and the frequency of occurrence of the 
hermeneutic and proairetic codes, and an inverse relationship with the 
frequency of occurrence of the symbolic, semic, and referential codes, 
(postulated on the previous page) is false. It is plain that this hypothesis does 
not adequately characterize for Barthes the nature of the relationships between 
die five codes. 
However, this only leads one to wonder whether Barthes would have felt 
such a correlation to be necessary. Given that the text is a network of codes, 
some correlation amongst the frequency of occurrence of the codes is to be 
expected, because one would expect such a correlation to indicate the climaxes 
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in the text -- that is, the points in this non-classic reading at which key features 
of the contract are evident, the points at which the text answers the questions it 
raises. One would expect a similar level of occurrences of the semic and 
symbolic codes at these points, for Barthes argues that the text's structure is 
formed out of the links given by these two codes to the apparently separate 
nested narratives (that of the narrator at the party, and the tale of Sarrasine and 
La Zambinella). If there is no relationship between the five codes, the 
implication is that either the division has at least not been correctly-executed, or 
that maybe there are more or fewer than five codes. 
Indeed, I think that there is some overlap between the five codes, in 
particular between the semic and the symbolic. Examining the classifications 
made (for example, "femininity"), it seems very hard to make a distinction 
between the two sets of terms. Consider the terms "the woman and the Snake" 
and "Mother and Son". Given Barthes' definitions of semic and symbolic, 
how would one classify these terms? It is not automatically apparent that the 
first is semic and the second symbolic. The problem becomes even more 
apparent when one considers the following pairs of terms: "Fragility" and 
"Weakness", "Composite" and "Castration", "Composite" and "The 
Reassembled Body". There is little point in continuing in this vein. It is plain 
that several of the terms classified as semic could equally be classified as 
symbolic, and vice versa. Furthermore, for no apparent reason some terms are 
used in both categories, such as "Wealth" (usually semic, but symbolic in lexia 
36 (see p. 43); and also the reference to gold, lexia 50 (see p. 48), is classified 
as symbolic), the supernatural (usually semic, but classified as symbolic in the 
case of lexia 109 (see p. 69)). 
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Occasionally Barthes slips, in that he could record the existence of a term 
but does not, and his reasons for not doing so are unclear. For example, lexia 
146 (see p. 87), where he describes the circulation of counterfeit money 
apparent in the passage, yet does not refer to the seme "Wealth". Also lexia 
161 (see p. 94), where he notes that the lexia refers to the cultural code, but 
does not give it a "REF" citation. There are a few other instances of this failure 
to note the existence of a code whilst using it: lexia 212 (see p. 109) -
note that it is also a literary code under "REF"; lexia 295 (see p. 1-34) - also a 
reference to the code of singers having protectors; lexia 443 (see p. 175) ~ also 
a reference to the code of dreams, or of the unconscious; lexia 471 (see pp. 
186-87) -- a reference to the Oedipal code: the idea of the rejected father, lexia 
483 (see p. 190) -- a reference to the literary code of the mysterious, the gothic; 
and lexia 558 (see p. 214) -- a reference to wealth, but this seme is not noted. 
Of course, others may disagree. Perhaps this example gives some indication 
of the limited degree to which one can differ in interpretation (for want of a 
better word) when using this technique of classifying the text into five codes. 
A slightly more serious case is lexia 404 (see pp. 161-62), where La 
Zambinella's basis for declining an offer of love amounts to an equivocation 
about his sexuality. So I would note: "HER. Enigma 6: equivocation." 
However, such matters are not crucial to Barthes' work. 
Let us consider lexias held to be only symbolic as against those held to be 
only semic, and note whether a clear distinction can be made between the two: 
(42) It seemed that he was an enchanted being upon whom 
depended the happiness, the life, or the fortune of them all. 
* SEM. Fascination. This signifier could lead to the truth, it 
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being the castrato's nature to enchant, like a supernatural 
medium: thus Farinelli, who cured, or at least assuaged, the 
morbid melancholia of Philip V of Spain by singing to him 
daily (always the same melody for years on end), (pp. 45-
46). 
(71) Thereupon, she gathered up enough courage to look for 
a moment at this creature for which the human language had 
no name, a form without substance, a being without life, or a 
life without action. * The neuter, the gender proper to the 
castrato, is signified by lack of soul (or animation: the 
inanimate, in the Indo-European languages, is the 
determinant of - the neuter): the private repetition 
(without.. . ) is the diagrammatical form of castration, the 
appearance of life in one lacking life (SYM. The neuter). ** 
The old man's portrait, which will follow and which is here 
rhetorically indicated, takes form within a framework 
established by the young woman {gathered up enough 
courage to look...), but by means of a dissolve of the 
original voice, the description will be carried out by the 
discourse: the body of the old man copies a painted model 
(SYM. Replication of bodies), (p. 54). 
The two statements on their own do not seem vastly different. Both are 
statements about an individual's reaction to another individual. But not to 
consider them in context would be unfair to Barthes. The first statement was 
made describing the (then) mysterious old man, and the way in which he 
would be perceived by a person unaware of his history and his relationship to 
the Lantys. He is seen as an enigma. The second statement occurs shortly 
afterwards, also describing the old man. Again, the standpoint from which he 
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is perceived is that of an individual unaware of his connection with the Lantys, 
and bewildered by him. He is still seen as an enigma, but an unpleasant one. 
Before coming to any conclusion let us consider another such instance: 
(171) Astonished at the young artist's progress and 
intelligence, Bouchardon * SEM. Genius (genius crowns 
the artist's vocation, cf. No. 173). 
(172) soon became aware of his pupil's poverty; he helped 
him, grew fond of him, treated him like his own son. 
* Bouchardon replaces not the father but the mother, whose 
absence (No. 153) has led the child into licentiousness, 
excess, anomie; like a mother, Bouchardon understands, 
cares for, helps (SYM. Mother and son), (p. 97). 
Here the relationship is more marked. The first lexia refers to an 
individual (Sarrasine), and the second to one person's relationship with that 
individual. One would like to generalize and say that usually the semic code 
indicates a reference to the nature of the individual (as textual construct), and 
the symbolic code to the relationship the individual has with those around 
him/her. This would explain why "Antithesis" is placed under the symbolic 
code and not the semic. But clearly not all the lexias listed as symbolic deal 
with the relationship of the individual to those around him. Ignoring for the 
moment the possibility of typographical errors, one is left with the realization 
that if "initiation" is considered to imply relationship, and thus: 
(213) The young sculptor's senses were, so to speak, 
lubricated by the accents ofJomelli's sublime harmony. The 
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langojrous novelties of these skilfully mingled Italian voices 
plunged him into a delicious ecstasy. * Although La 
Zambinella has not yet appeared, structurally Sarrasine's 
passion has begun, his seduction inaugurated by a 
preliminary ecstasy; a long series of bodily states that will 
lead Sarrasine from capture to conflagration (ACT. 
"Seduction": 1: ecstasy). ** REF. Italian music. 
*** Hitherto, Sarrasine has been sequestered from sex; 
thus, this evening is the first time he knows pleasure and 
loses his virginity (SYM. Initiation) (p. 109). 
then surely the following lexia also implies "initiation"and some relationship 
with others: 
(164) Whether copying the characters in the pictures that 
decorated the choir, or improvising, he always left behind 
him some gross sketches whose licentiousness shocked the 
younger fathers; evil tongues maintaining that the older 
Jesuits were amused by them. * SEM. Licentiousness 
(kneading is an erotic activity). ** REF. Psychology of 
ages (the young are strict; the old, permissive), (p. 96). 
Furthermore, recalling Barthes' own definition of the two terms, 
synibolic dealing with a symbolic area (an unfortunately circular definition that 
does not tell us much), and semic with the signifier, not linked to a particular 
person or object (see p. 19), it is arguable that such a distinction has not 
always been carefully made. And so, perhaps, "Licentiousness" has been 
wrongly classified as semic. But then, even if Barthes' distinctions are in 
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themselves sound (an issue I would not like to prejudge), his application of 
them to the text may not always be apt 
But the question is: does one want to make this distinction between semic 
and symbolic codes; or, more accurately, has such a distinction in fact been 
made? Given that in some cases it will be particularly difficult to decide 
whether a reference is to character (in the New Critical sense) alone, or the 
character in relation to another, a case can be made for uniting the two codes to 
form one. This notion is not far-fetched, despite the lack of correlation 
between the two codes. Indeed, this lack of correlation is an argument in 
favour of conflating the two codes. For although ostensibly dealing with 
different issues, given that that which separates one code from the other is 
unclear in Barthes' practice, that such distinctions are not easily made, and that 
both deal with the "individual", it would seem reasonable to combine the two. 
A counterargument is given by Rice and Schofer, who point out that the 
semic code refers to connotations, and uses metonymy, synecdoche, and 
metaphor. They consider it to be paradigmatic, depending on a syntagmatic 
relationship which the reader establishes, and to work by metaphor, using 
resemblance, causality, inclusion, and opposition.^i However, the symbolic, 
when considered as a code, usually refers to both processes, and it is for this 
reason that the difference between the two codes is not apparent. 
To make my argument plain: the term symbol refers to denotation --
something standing for something else. Thus both metaphor and metonymy 
(that is, the transfer of a descriptive term from one object to a different but 
21 Donald Rice and Peter Schofer, "5/Z: Rhetoric and Open Reading," L'Espnt Createur, 22, 
No. 1 (1982), pp. 25-26. 
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analogous object; and the substitution for the name of a thing, the name of an 
attribute of it) are examples of the use of symbol, as is synecdoche.22 From 
this point it is easy to argue that the difference between semic and symbolic is 
not only unclear in the text, but does not yield insights into the structure of the 
text. Thus one is in fact dealing with one code that has been unevenly divided 
into the semic and symbolic codes - this is the symbolic. 
But a further question must be asked: are Rice and Schofer correct? Let 
us reconsider the above example of lexias 2 1 3 and 164. The argument would 
be that lexia 2 1 3 displays the use of a metaphor in a paradigmatic fashion, 
based on a syntagmatic relationship.which the reader establishes. So that lexia 
is based on a set of propositions the reader derives from the text, uses 
metaphor - via resemblance and causality (and possibly also opposition). And 
lexia 164? -- it does not use, synecdoche, nor metonymy; but Barthes' 
application of the semic term "Licentiousness" does show a use of metaphor. 
And so, as I noted, the distinction between semic and symbolic is not a clear 
one. Although such a distinction is possible, what Rice and Schofer have 
failed to show is that this is the distinction Barthes makes in 5/Z. 1 think it is 
clear that if such a distinction is intended, it is certainly not made consistently. 
Since the text does not indicate any clear distinction between the semic and 
symbolic codes, one may as well consider uniting the two codes to form one --
the symbolic code. 
However, such an approach would then require one to conflate the 
resulting code with the proairetic code, since it also deals with the "individual" 
and his/her relations with others. This leaves one with three codes: the 
22i have relied on the Oxford English Dictionary for all the definitions of terms used in this 
paragraph. 
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referential, the hermeneutic, and that of the character. The hermeneutic code 
could, in the old parlance, also be called the thematic approach, for it deals 
with issues thrown up by the text, questions which the text answers, or at least 
endeavours to answer. "Character" is clearly a self-conscious use of the term -
- an awareness of it in terms of the structure of the work rather than any 
psychological sense. The referential code could be considered equivalent to the 
New Critical concept of allusion, or at least potential for allusion. 
Of course, one need not agree with or care about my argument that the 
codes can be condensed of reworked, that there is an overlap between the 
codes. One could instead note that any overlap between the codes is irrelevant 
because the text is a network which one wants to enter at any point, and that 
overlap between the codes is one way of ensuring that at any point no reader is 
forced to continually follow one path, but instead always has several voices to 
which s/he may pay attention. 
Even if this is so, one can still consider why Barthes wants to avoid more 
traditional terms, why doesn't he simply complain that critics have tended to 
talk of texts as though of people, rather than create new critical terms? One 
argument for the creation of new critical terms is that the terms currently in use 
-- character, theme, allusion -- are tainted. For years these terms have been 
used to refer to "real" characters, to undertake psychological examination of 
motives, and to consider the themes of a work in psychological terms. These 
words may be seen as beyond redemption. They are beyond redemption 
because of their association with bourgeois conceptions of reality and of 
people, conceptions which Barthes wishes to discredit. Thus the use of codes 
is part of Barthes' attempt to go beyond bourgeois criticism. To use such 
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terms as character, theme, allusion, is to run the risk of being seen as 
essentially accepting bourgeois ideology. 
Let us consider whether the commentary Barthes has written on 
"Sarrasine" could also have been arrived at by a "self-conscious" thematic or 
character-oriented method of criticism, which at the same time does not view 
the characters as open to psychological interpretation because they are 
constructs, not beings. I want to sketch such a piece of criticism, not using 
Barthes' five codes. Here one can only make assertions, for there is no 
comparable critique of "Sarrasine" as detailed as Barthes'. But I believe that 
most of what Barthes has written cpuld be covered by an approach which did 
not use his concepts of the codes, and which did not examine the text in the 
same degree of detail. 
One can envisage the outline of such an essay: the text of "Sarrasine" 
forms a "dance" created around its central character, Sarrasine. Sarrasine is 
deceived by La Zambinella and his friends, and by himself. The story is a 
study of the result of mingled desire and delusion. It is not so much that desire 
causes delusion, but that each can fire the other to greater heights. However, 
one aspect of the delusion must be present in order to complete the pyramid 
which Sarrasine scales - the belief that one has the ability to see the truth of 
things. This is the belief of the realist artist, even such an artist as Balzac. 
Sarrasine falls prey not just to La Zambinella and his friends, but to himself. 
His creation of the statue of La Zambinella is a statement of his belief that he 
can see the underlying truth about people, and reveal it through his art. But his 
art is hollow because La Zambinella is not as Sarrasine conceived him, and 
also because to be castrated is to be hollow, devoid of sexuality. Sarrasine's 
desire to destroy the statue is also a desire to destroy any reminder of his old 
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self-confidence, and also of his own desire, perverted through no fault of his 
own. The tale also notes the decadence of a society in which people contract 
for sex in return for a short story, or amass fortunes by prostituting 
themselves. The story in which the tale of Sarrasine himself is embedded 
reflects the narrator's position. For the narrator desires Mme de Rochefide as 
Sarrasine desired La Zambinella. But in this instance the consummation of 
such desire is not halted by physical inability (one type of emptiness), but by 
emotional inability (another type of emptiness). It, too, shows how contracts 
may be tentatively formed ~ that between the narrator and Mme de Rochefide 
paralleling the implicit one made by La Zambinella with Sarrasine - and 
broken, or formed without any intention of their being held. It is also about 
what it is to be "other", to be denied access to a full range of human 
experience, either due to emotional incapacity (in the case of Sarrasine and 
Mme de Rochefide) or physical disability (in the case of La Zambinella). 
Clearly this is a very rough outline of a possible approach to the story, 
and there are many others. The point is simply that most of the statements 
made by Barthes can be made using a thematic or character oriented approach, 
bearing in mind that one is dealing with an artifice, a construction, not a real 
episode dealing with real people. Though, to what extent my short piece of 
criticism was dependent on Barthes' account is undecidable, given that I read 
his account first. 
It is plain that the sort of analysis just outlined does highlight some 
aspects of the tale which Barthes' analysis does not. The most obvious 
difference is that this approach encourages one to move back and forth between 
the story of the narrator and that of Sarrasine, making connections between the 
two to a greater extent than Barthes does in 5/Z. It also allows one to examine 
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in detail the relationship between the themes of the story as presented through 
the relationship of the characters far more readily than Barthes has done. It 
could also entail a discussion of the nature of "femininity" as a construct in the 
work - another issue skirted by Barthes. 
But rather than comment on the advantages of a familiar method, it is 
worth considering some points which Barthes considers to arise "naturally" 
from his use of the five codes - points which would be obscured by using the 
usual critical technique. One such instance is his comment on lexia 47 (see p. 
47), where the Count is shown to be no favourite of the old man. Barthes 
notes the inversion of the usual sexual stereotypes. For in the Lanty family it 
is Mme de Lanty who has effective control, and her husband is the person 
whose authority is uncertain (see p. 47). This role reversal has important 
ramifications later in the text when dealing with what it is to be a castrato, to be 
a man, or to be a woman. Another such instance is his comment on the 
narrator's meditation on "the human coin", noting that it is symbolic of the lack 
of communication, and would probably be recognized as such by non-
Structuralist critics. But Barthes' description of the antithesis involved and 
how it is broached is, as far as I know, unique to his method, and highlights 
the disparities and unities of the text. For example, it deals with the 
relationship between Mme de Rochefide and the old man in a simple fashion, 
yet noting more than a simple contrast, linking in themes of the text more 
neatly than the usual approach would allow. Yet another such example is 
Barthes' comment on the description of the old man as clearly consumptive, 
pointing out that the body is the source of interest in the old man (see lexia 75, 
p. 56). This is noted, I believe, at a far earlier stage than a traditional approach 
would afford, where the emphasis on the second nested narrative and the linear 
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approach to criticism of the tale would have delayed the making of the 
connection between the old man and La Zambinella. Finally, lexia 83 (see p. 
59), describing the old man's appearance, is worth considering. Barthes notes 
that the old man is painted, and thus his own double - therefore tautological, 
and so sterile. The train of thought links in with the concern with painting, 
with the nature of the connection between art and reality - for one of the major 
questions about La Zambinella is the connection between art and reality 
(artificial though the distinction may be) as manifest in his person. And yet 
Barthes only hints at this. 
Non-structuralist criticism (such as that practiced by the New Critics) can 
characterize the five codes as simply an inferior way of looking at texts. This 
is not to say that the relationship between bourgeois criticism and such 
criticism as Barthes produces may not be important. J. Hillis Miller argued 
that in the literary world, as in many other spheres, hosts and parasites are 
interdependent -- neither can survive without the other -- making the host in 
effect a parasite, and vice versa.23 If one agrees with this argument, one could 
claim that Barthes is dependent upon mainstream (bourgeois) criticism as 
something against which he can react, and that bourgeois criticism is in turn 
dependent upon criticism which seeks to subvert it (as Barthes' criticism does). 
But in what way can bourgeois criticism be dependent upon a subversive 
criticism which does not subvert? Only in so far as the existence of such 
criticism verifies the bourgeois nature of bourgeois criticism, and underpins the 
notion that all criticism is essentially bourgeois - to do with consumption 
rather than production. In 5/Z not only has Barthes not succeeded in his 
23see J. Hillis Miller, "The Critic as Host," in Deconslruction and Criticism. Harold Bloom 
et al (New York: The Seabury Press, 1979), p. 221. 
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attempt to characterize mainstream (bourgeois) criticism as essentially fascist, 
but bourgeois criticism can easily characterize his own criticism as limited, a 
weaker version of itself. 
59 
11. 
Barthes emphasizes his desire for a criticism that is not explication de 
texte in the traditional sense (see p. 90). He constantly emphasizes his desire 
to make plain the plurality of the text, thus his comment on literature and 
painting, "Why not wipe out the difference between them (purely one of 
substance)? Why not forego the plurality of the 'arts' in order to affirm more 
powerfully the plurality of 'texts'?" (p. 56). To be concerned to-show that a 
text is plural implies a prevailing counter-view that considers texts in terms of 
their unity. Indeed, this is the traditional approach to the classic text (as 
Roland Barthes defines it) in French criticism. So not only is Barthes trying to 
describe and impose a vision of society (the outline of which will unfold upon 
a closer examination of his criticism), but he is also trying to disarm traditional 
French criticism, which implies another vision of society. 
Barthes does not claim inadequacy for particular critics (no one is singled 
out for special mention), instead he is concerned with the inadequacies of 
criticism in general as he wants us to believe it was practiced -- its emphasis on 
unity, on seeing society as a whole rather than as a collection of discrete 
individuals, on maintaining the status quo (in itself a mythical construct), and 
thus the dominance of the bourgeoisie in French society and letters.^^ His 
concern is in fact with the bourgeois vision of society, although he takes no 
pains to outiine or define clearly what such a vision may be. As SIZ proceeds 
certain "values" come to be associated with "the bourgeois" -- a desire to 
maintain the status quo, to consume rather than produce, to be passive rather 
24see David Bellos, Balzac Criticism in France 1859-1900: The Making of a Reputation 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, \916), passim, for historical background. 
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than active, and so on. In general, that which Barthes reacts against can be 
classified as bourgeois -- if only because of his desire to differentiate his stance 
from any view or opinion associated with the bourgeoisie. The manifestations 
of this desire should become apparent as this chapter progresses. 
His concem with the bourgeois in literature extends to his definitions of 
readerly and writerly - for it is the readerly text which he sees as the classic 
(bourgeois) text (for example, "Sarrasine" and other works by Balzac), 
whereas the writerly text is characterized as essentially anti-bourgeois because 
it aims to make the reader a producer, not a consumer, of texts (see p. 4). 
Thus Barthes' criticism is openly subversive, aiming to undermine the 
bourgeois concept of consumption (which is seen as fundamental to bourgeois 
society) by using the consumed product for production. Economically 
speaking, Barthes is redefining final products for consumption as intermediate 
products to be used in the process of production. He is shifting the focus on 
texts away from consumption (a bourgeois activity or attitude) towards 
production. Yet at the same time he does not openly associate the bourgeois 
and the desire to consume (although he does provide broad hints, e.g. his 
discussion of the desire to throw away stories once consumed as part of the 
"commercial and ideological habits of our society . . . " (p. 15)) -- the reader 
is left to make the connection, to engage in an act of production. 
So for Barthes to reject a consideration of the unity of the text, and 
therefore explication de lexte, and to emphasize the structure rather than the 
plan of "Sarrasine" (see p. 90), is for him to reject a view of the text as a 
unified whole, a response to situations in life, presenting a desirable attitude 
towards life to be consumed by the reader; and rather to see it as a construct, a 
contract. Thus Barthes is trying to tell a different story about texts. 
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emphasizing their plurality, but also their bourgeois origins - distancing 
himself from such texts by declaring himself not bourgeois (often overtly, as in 
"Myth Today" in Mythologies),'^^ and at the same time admitting his 
fascination with things bourgeois by constantly writing about them. To 
describe the text as created not on the basis of a plot, but on the basis of a 
structure - in this case, economic exchange (that is what the text is "about") -
is to betray one's concern not with the economics of bourgeois society, but 
with its vision of reality. 
One of the cornerstones of the bourgeois conception of reality as Barthes 
characterizes it is that it is Hnear, that it tells a story, and that therefore in stories 
all the elements should be orchestrated around a central theme. Thus Barthes 
begins by attacking this conception of the text, instead positing a vision of the 
text as plural (see pp. 4-5). Barthes notes that "To interpret a text is not to give 
it a (more or less justified, more or less free) meaning, but on the contrary to 
appreciate what plural constitutes it." (p. 5). It is worth comparing this 
statement with Empson's definition of ambiguity, "any verbal nuance, 
however slight, which gives room for alternative reactions to the same piece of 
language. "26 At first it would seem that Barthes' statement is text-oriented, 
implying that the plural exists in the text, and that it only takes an aware reader 
to appreciate it, whereas Empson seems reader-oriented - who picks up its 
"verbal nuances." As we have seen, to accept this as Empson's view of the 
relationship between a reader and a text is to fail to appreciate how complex a 
matter the interpretation of texts is for Empson. But Barthes' statement also 
gives rise to some queries: does plurality lie in the text, or is it something 
25Roland Barthes, Mythologies, selected and translated by Anneue Lavers (Frogmore, 
Hertfordshire: Granada, 1973), pp. 109-59. 
26william Empson, Seven Types of Ambiguity (London: Chatto and Windus, 1953), p. 1. 
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Barthes would have us believe? I am inclined to think that Barthes would have 
us believe that texts are plural, and that this is the cornerstone of Barthes' myth 
of the text and, for that matter, the basis of many a structuralist approach to 
textual criticism. It is the basis of his way of using classic writing (normally 
associated with a bourgeois view of life) to create a criticism which is anything 
but bourgeois. 
So when Barthes talks of connotation as the trace of "that limited plural 
on which the classic text is based" (p. 8), one cannot help wondering whether 
such a text is limited, or whether that is the way in which Barthes would have 
us consider such a text. To see the classic text as an infinite network (see p. 
12), and at the same time to insist that the plural of the classic text is limited is 
puzzling, and indicates some tension in Barthes' rejection of bourgeois 
ideology. It could be argued that the way in which Barthes treats this text 
undermines his argument that classic texts are limited,^'' in that his treatment of 
"Sarrasine" makes clear just how free of limitations classic texts are. But I 
think this is a symptom of Barthes' attempt to cope with the classic text, and 
thus with the bourgeois. On the one hand there is the emphasis on the 
bourgeois, and even on plurality as an aspect of the bourgeois (thus the 
connotations of gold described on p. 40), and on the other hand there is the 
claim that the "readerly eye" is a bourgeois constraint on our reading of texts 
(see pp. 29-30). Cutting across Barthes' notions of plurality and the classic 
text is the claim that the idea that the text contains insignificant elements is a 
bourgeois notion, and that texts should be seen as containing no insignificant 
elements (pp. 4-15). 
27see Susan R. Suleiman, "The Question of Readability in Avant-Garde Ficuon," Studies in 
Twentieth Century Literature. 6, Nos. 1 & 2 (1981/2). pp. 17-35. 
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Barthes' attitude towards connotation as "the way into . . . that limited 
plural on which the classic text is based" (p. 8), implies a categorisation of 
connotation as a tool of bourgeois critics, like, say, William Empson. This 
attitude allows Barthes to convenientiy ignore other critics, having discredited 
both their beliefs as to a desirable structure for society and their critical tools. 
Consider also Barthes' opinion of the nature of the dichotomy of 
subjectivity / objectivity, seeing both as "an imaginary system" limiting of the 
plural of the text, considering both to essentially imply that the reader 
consumes, that reading is a "a parasitical act" (p. 10) ~ and then he concludes 
therefore are both bourgeois notiqns, the validity of which he denies. Once 
something has been characterized as bourgeois, having established this as an 
evil, then it can be put to one side as "false". That which is not "false" must, 
logically, be true (or at worst indeterminate). 
Reading need not be "false". Furthermore, Barthes' emphasis on the 
need to re-read texts makes plain his desire to engage in an act of reading 
which is primarily not an act of consumption - "contrary to the commercial 
and ideological habits of our society, which would have us 'throw away' the 
story once it has been consumed ( ' d e v o u r e d ' ) . . . " (p. 15) -- but of 
production, for re-reading "multiplies [the text] . . . in its variety and its 
plurality . . . ." (p. 16). 
Barthes has a range of beliefs about the nature of the bourgeois: that it is 
anti-plural, that it uses certain tools - e.g. connotation, subjectivity - but in 
fact limit the text, and that it uses irony to limit meaning. We are dealing with a 
conception of the bourgeois as fascist ideology, an ideology which limits 
interpretation. It is the conception Barthes would have us, his readers, believe. 
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There are, after all, other possible beliefs about what it is to be bourgeois. It is 
the idea of the bourgeois as natural and simple which Barthes would deny, and 
therefore the notion that bourgeois novels are "based on the operation of 
solidarity " (p. 23). He notes that: 
The (ideological) goal of [the technique of writing in a 
readerly f a s h i o n ] . . . is to naturalize meaning and thus to 
give credence to the reali ty of the story . . . . 
paradoxically, language, the integral system of meaning, is 
employed to desystematize secondary meanings . . . . (p. 
23). 
Yet it is worth noting that in trying to cope with the bourgeois attempt to 
naturalize what is seen as an unnatural act practised upon language, he has 
chosen a story which deals with the unnatural to do so. 
Roland Barthes sees the structure of "Sarrasine" as being the story "of a 
c o n t r a c t . . . of a force (the narrative) and the action of this force on the very 
contract controlling i t " (p. 90). The implication of such a statement is that the 
work is not a story which represents life, but rather a fleshing out of certain 
bourgeois concerns -- the nature of language, of the body, and of money (and 
therefore contracts) (see p. 215). It is this attitude as evident in the text that 
marks it as a classic text (using Barthes' definition of the term). To this extent 
the text is "representative" of life, or at least of bourgeois attitudes humans can 
have in relation to issues that concern them. For one to consider "Sarrasine" in 
the classic fashion would be to consider these concerns to be evident in every 
Western society (at least) at virtually any stage of its development, and to 
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consider such concerns to be natural and therefore not requiring further 
attention. Barthes, in his movement away from what he perceives to be the 
classic approach to the text, denies that such issues need no further attention, 
and uses the division of the text into voices as a way of formulating concerns 
he finds evident in the text. But this division is also a way of limiting the 
impact of such concerns by considering them to be constructs. 
The main reason for Barthes' creation and use of the five codes in dealing 
with the text is his argument that they do not encourage the critic to see the 
characters as real, or to see the story as anything more than a structure, woven 
out of these codes (see p. 21). One logical conclusion of this approach is to 
consider irrelevant the opinions of the author of the text regarding the concerns 
of that text. The text is seen as writing itself. However, one could also 
conclude that the author's opinions are important given such an approach, for it 
is the author who has manufactured the text. 
But how many of these codes were planned by the author, or are clearly 
part of the plan of the text? The question of intention is side-stepped by 
Barthes. Even if one cannot consider the intention of the text, one can consider 
the extent to which the text has a plan. Of course, if one believes that the aim 
of criticism is to create as many different interpretations of the text as possible, 
then any allusion which seems plausible is an allusion which is part of the text-
plan. But this raises another question - what is the criterion by which the 
plausibility of an allusion is tested? If texts are indeterminate and plural, then 
any allusion is made by the text. If reading is considered from the reader's 
point of view (what is plausible is what the reader thinks is plausible, not what 
the author intended), then the problem of what is plausible disappears. But if 
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texts are seen as products of authors, as Empson sometimes thought of them, 
then the question of plausibility and how one decides it becomes crucial. 
Given that the five codes were designed by Barthes to ensure that readers 
did not examine the text in the usual bourgeois fashion, and thus find that the 
text confirms the bourgeois concept of society, the failure of these codes to 
allow the distinction in types of criticism (bourgeois versus Barthesian) is 
serious. It indicates that Barthes has not successfully denied the role of the 
author in the creation of a text, nor the role of the bourgeois society in 
interpreting i t 
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III. 
What is Barthes' philosophy of the text? There are certain assumptions 
which Barthes make plain at the outset which are worth examining. The most 
important of these is that the best texts are not closed (pp. 3-12). So the 
criticism of Structuralism that it results in discovering that the best stories are 
highly structured tales, like those of Conan Doyle, would seem to be u n f a i r , 
firstly because SIZ is not an example of Structuralist criticism, and secondly 
because, as Barthes shows, "Sarrasine" is not a closed text - it is at least 
partially open (adopting Barthes' definitions of these terms). 
An assumption with which Barthes begins is that a text not only has 
structure, but that it must also have a plurality of meanings for it to be 
considered a good text His argument that the function of the hermeneutic code 
is to thicken the enigma by outlining it, and that character should be 
subordinate to plot (see p. 62), is not a necessary correlative of such an 
approach, nor is it a particularly new notion. What Barthes desires, then, is a 
text that is structured, with a plurality of meanings at any particular stage, in 
which plot takes precedence over character (in the more naive sense of the 
word) -- which makes it sound rather like Empson's vision of poetry. It is an 
approach with which one may not agree, but it is hardly new, nor a necessary 
outcome of the kind of criticism in which Barthes engages. 
Another assumption Barthes makes is that the function of each text is to 
"cohere . . . by the infinite paradigm of difference, subjecting it from the 
outset to a basic typology, to an evaluation." (p. 3). Linking this to the notion 
28This simplification of structuralism is put forward by Philip Thody m his Roland Barli^s: 
A Conservative Estimate (London and Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press, 1977), pp. 119-
20. 
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that the reader writes the text (p. 10), one cannot help but conclude that Barthes 
accepts that each reader brings his/her own particular ideology (systems of 
beliefs) to a text, and that this is not a bad thing or is, perhaps, inescapable. 
But the notion that one should begin by re-reading the text is strange (see 
pp. 15-16). It is true that when one re-reads the result is that one is more 
aware of the clues placed in the text by the author which hint at the outcome of 
the tale, of the structure of the text ~ aspects of the text masked by the desire to 
know the outcome during the first reading. Much of the structure of the text, 
its clues, etc., one cannot hope to recognize during a first reading, no matter 
how one tries to read carefully. It is true that on re-reading a text one is more 
aware of its plurality (as opposed to the classic notion of unity). But this does 
lead to a view of the text as a Rubik's cube, a puzzle to be played with, to be 
solved. 
There are a whole range of assumptions Barthes makes about the nature 
of words, or of the world, which colour his criticism. For example, Barthes 
argues that beauty is only describable by analogy or tautology (see pp. 33-34), 
but that ugliness is directly describable. But the old man is not described as 
ugly, but as arousing certain reactions (e.g. cold, p. 42), as being old, like a 
lunatic, like a machine, or a sleep-walker (see pp. 49-50), or as consumptive, 
like a ship of death (see p. 56). Clearly to then argue that the old man is the 
named (because ugly) unnameable (because "supernatural") relies on the notion 
that beauty is the unnamed (because beautiful) unnameable (because if perfect, 
then also "supernatural"). Naming and namelessness are the basis on which 
Barthes defines metaphysical conceptions of beauty and ugliness (see pp. 33-
34). 
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A similar dichotomy can be found in his equating power and (male) 
potency. He claims that because women wield power in "Sarrasine" they must 
be castrators (see p. 36). It is interesting to consider the story in the light of 
the dichotomy of castrating/castrated paralleling that of active/passive, potent 
and impotent. Of course, one could criticise this dichotomy as being a 
syllogism with one term not drawn from the universe of the text: only passive 
characters are not castrators (this being based on his own beliefs), the women 
in "Sarrasine" are not passive, therefore they are castrators. - The use of 
syllogisms, with one premise drawn from Barthes' own set of beliefs, in order 
to draw conclusions about the text is a common practice in StZ. 
Similarly, in his discussion of the letter "Z" (see pp. 106-107) it becomes 
apparent that Barthes has a set of associations with the letter which he then 
uses to draw associations within the text. For "Z" can also be associated with 
peace and sleep (thus the cartoon representation of a man snoring). It is the 
letter of castration, in that it is the first letter of the name "Zambinella", only in 
this story. Drawing upon one's own associations is to be expected given 
Barthes' belief in criticising texts from the reader's point of view. However, 
this leaves Barthes open to criticism for not making a broader range of 
references and picking premisses for his syllogisms. Barthes avoids defining 
in what ways the text can define the reader's interpretation of it, yet his own 
criticism contains an implicit acknowledgement that this is how texts (or maybe 
authors) operate on readers. 
A consideration of some of the assumptions Barthes makes about the 
nature of texts may prove more fruitful. One of these assumptions is that 
structure is not design, and that all elements of a text signify (see p. 51, and it 
is implied on p. 182). Everything signifies something. But how calculating is 
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this text, any text, any reader? Does every word always have so much 
meaning? The text or, for that matter, the reader, may not require that eveiy 
word be so charged with meaning, or that every word refer to all possible 
interpretations of it. 
At times Barthes does seem to imply that the existence of the author is 
crucial at least to the production of the text. He describes how the voices of the 
text are interwoven by hand (see p. 160). By whose hand? Surely this is an 
implicit acknowledgement of the importance of the author in the production of 
the text. And if the author is so crucial to the production of the text, as 
discussions about the relationship between the text and reality also imply, then 
surely the author must have some role in the use of the text as a factor of 
production. Barthes tacitiy acknowledges this, which is why in his program 
for modem literature he must consider how the author may be removed from 
the text. Although not stricdy relevant to this discussion, his attitude towards 
the concept of authorial presence is interesting. He argues that if the author 
sees "his life as a bio-graphy (in the etymological sense of the word)" (p. 
211), then he will not make himself the sole authority in relation to the text (see 
pp. 211-12). This argument is simply illogical. It is based on the belief that if 
one is aware of one's presence in a text, one can ensure one's absence. As 
many modem novels have shown, for example, Ulysses, this is by no means 
an easy task, and probably impossible -- for any style is a signature, a mark of 
presence; even a description of an experiment implies the existence of its 
author, and betrays it despite the use of the passive and other such devices. 
Classic texts often contain evidence of being constructs, as though 
deliberately placed in the text by the author to remind the reader that s/he is 
only "reading a story". Barthes' implied conclusion that authors of classic 
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texts wish to be fascist in relation to the determination of meaning (for 
otherwise they would not dictate the forms of the text's meaning to the reader) 
does not appear to be true. It may be the case that an author cannot avoid 
dictating the forms of the text's meaning, even if s/he is aware of the 
possibilities of such a "dictatorship". 
Let us focus a little more clearly on Barthes' conception of texts, of 
language, and so forth. He argues that the function of the sentence "is to 
justify the culture of the narrative" (p. 127). And that: 
writing is active, for it acts for the reader: it proceeds not 
from an author but from a public scribe, a notary 
institutionally responsible not for flattering his client's tastes 
but rather for registering at his dictation the summary of his 
interests, the operations by which, within an economy of 
disclosure, he manages this merchandise: the narrative, (p. 
152). 
There seems to be some disparity between these two opinions, for the former 
implies that the text need have nothing to do with any culture other than that 
which it creates (and therefore also implies that the function of the sentence is 
also to justify the culture of the narrative), whereas the latter implies that the 
text must somehow reflect the culture of the reader - his interests, and so 
forth. Later, Barthes notes that ultimately the narrative has no object, and 
concerns only itself (see p. 213), implying that although the narrative may have 
something to do with the culture of the reader, it ultimately does not. But how 
can this be the case? What is it for a narrative to deal with the concerns of its 
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readers but ultimately be unrelated to them? And in what ways can a narrative 
concern only itself? Indeed, could such a narrative exist? I doubt it, for then it 
would be unreadable, having no reference which the reader could understand 
(apart, perhaps, from the notion of "narrative"). The implication of this 
approach is that the ideal narrative would have nothing to do with any reader -
it would not need to be readable, would not require a reader. But then, why 
bother writing, or, more correctly, why bother being written? 
Alternatively, if the dividing line between that which is suggested by a 
text and that which is suggested by a reader is irrelevant (an argument noted 
earlier), then what does it mean for a narrative to concern only itself? Does it 
mean that any reader's concerns, be they bourgeois or otherwise, are to be 
automatically ignored? If so, then this is locking the gate to ensure that no 
interpretation is possible. If not, then does it mean that any reader's concerns 
may be read into an unconcemed narrative? 
If this is the case there can be no "privileged" or "superior" criticism --
neither bourgeois nor otherwise. Then Barthes cannot discredit bourgeois 
criticism (it is as valid as his criticism), but only show that another type of 
criticism (that focussed on reading as an act of production) is equally or even 
more interesting. But even this begs the question, can reading be productive if 
texts are unrelated to the culture of their readers (in this case a culture of 
production rather than consumption)? Presumably this is possible, but then the 
text, any text, becomes merely an excuse for production or consumption -- not 
intrinsically different from any other excuse for production or consumption. 
Barthes' concept of realism is also interesting and worth examining. He 
believes that realism in fiction is the copying of a depicted copy of the real, 
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thus placing reality at yet a further remove from experience (see p. 55). But 
from such a transformation reality itself is made. He then notes that a real 
body is the replication of the notion of the human body set up by the arts (in 
particular, the visual arts), and this replication can only be interrupted by 
leaving nature and moving towards certain ideals. What is interesting is how 
such notions affect his concept of reading, of the text. 
For Barthes then argues that a realistic reading is one which allows 
meanings to move around, and that the figure is not the sum of meanings, but 
an additional one (see p. 61). Certainly the notion of the figure as the sum of 
meanings seems reasonable, but the argument that a realistic reading is one 
which allows meanings to move around is based, implicidy, on the notion that 
ideal meanings or concepts permeate the text, and that it is on this level that the 
text can approach or broach reality. This almost Platonic conception of text-
formation lies uneasily with Barthes' own rebellion against bourgeois writing 
and criticism. It seems that there is some confusion in Barthes' conception of 
the relationship between the text, the author, and an undefined reality. This 
confusion occurs because of his desire on the one hand to condemn the 
bourgeois conception of the real, and on the other to accept that it has a place in 
any and all texts -- be it as the origin or the far point (as a prospective code --
see p. 167). 
The extent of this confusion is plain in Barthes' description of the scene 
in which the narrator and Mme de Rochefide discuss the painting of the 
Adonis. To note that "this is the only homogeneous area, within which no one 
tells a lie" (p. 74) is to beg the question: what is it for a text to lie? Given the 
belief that the discourse, which is the network of the five codes, is the text, 
then does the discourse lie in this instance? For we are being misled as to the 
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nature of the model of the painting. But this is something Barthes does not 
note. It seems that his approach cannot provide answers to such questions. 
Indeed, it cannot even raise them. A text can only be considered to lie if there 
is a referent not within the text which is referred to as the truth. If this is not 
the case, the text simply states ~ the concept of lying is irrelevant 
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IV . 
There are some aspects of "Sarrasine" which Barthes' approach does 
highlight, just as there are some aspects it glosses over. Barthes' explication 
of the mechanics of antithesis is masterly, explaining clearly how each term is 
compared, contrasted, re-examined, before juxtaposition. An interesting point 
he also makes is that the story deals with juxtaposition rather than resolution 
(see pp. 26-28). Certainly for the body of most short stories this .would seem 
to be the case. 
Another aspect of the work which is well brought out by this method is 
that of "symbolic chains". For example, Paris is empty and cold, its emptiness 
implying castration — so Paris corresponds symbolically to the physical 
impossibility of procreating (see p. 40). Of course, one can disagree with the 
conclusion drawn, but the method draws the conclusion quickly and neatly. 
On the other hand, Barthes can occasionally slip and draw a conclusion which 
does not seem to be warranted. For example, when the narrator and Mme de 
Rochefide are alone in the room with the painting of Adonis, Barthes notes that 
the light in the room is that of the moon (see p. 70). Yet the text states that it is 
lamplight I can find no justification for Barthes' drawing the conclusion that it 
is moonlight. The light is like that of the moon, that is plain, but it is not 
moonlight. Barthes has momentarily confused signifier and signified. Yet 
Barthes' method of criticism does highlight the fact that form (which includes 
"symbolic chains") can affect what can happen in a tale (the noting of the 
structural pattern of the tale). 
This method of criticism also explains Sarrasine's deception very nicely, 
carefully noting the syllogisms involved, which premisses are false, and so 
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forth (for example, p. 148). But this seems to be a product less of the method 
and more of the mind behind it. One does not need Barthes' five codes in 
order to explore Sarrasine's self-deception in terms of syllogisms. And the 
method does have its failings, many of which we have akeady noted. One of 
the most important aspects of "Sarrasine" which is pushed to one side because 
of the strong emphasis on the five codes is the nature of femininity and how it 
relates to La Zambinella (or La Zambinella to it, for that matter). This is only 
skirted by Barthes, who never comes to grips with the comparison, tending to 
place all females as castrators, all males as passive, and La Zambinella as 
having qualities of both. This, I believe, does not do justice to the text, for it 
glosses over the differences between the characters for the sake of highlighting 
the one theme considered to be important - that of castration. Yet again 
Barthes' ideology takes control of his criticism. 
Furthermore, Barthes' use of the word "classic" to indicate whatever 
fiction that is realist in style is problematic because he assumes that the classic 
text (as he describes it) is not aware of its fictive nature, whereas it is plain 
from most such texts that the author (or maybe the text, to use Barthes' 
terminology) is aware of the fictive nature of the text^^ - thus the text of Jane 
Eyre addresses the reader, making one aware that one is engaged in the act of 
reading a fiction. This use of the term "the classic" is deliberate on Barthes' 
part, a distancing effect, it is a step in the chain of reasoning developed to 
show that bourgeois notions are necessarily fascist (as noted earlier). 
The upshot of these assumptions is that they colour Barthes' criticism, 
more so than the five codes he invented. For, as we can see, these terms can 
29christopher Norris, "Roland Barthes: The View from Here," Critical Quarterly, 20, No. 1, 
(1978), p. 31. 
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be dispensed with, resulting in the criticism of a self-conscious critic, using 
terms such as theme, symbol, character, etc. It is Barthes' "philosophy" 
(ideology, system of beliefs) rather than the terms themselves that make his 
criticism of interest, and different from the New Criticism, for example. As 
we have already noted, Barthes' criticism displays a greater emphasis on 
historical background, on the origins of a work. Thus, in criticising 
"Sarrasine" Barthes focuses on the myth of the realist artist as understanding 
reality, and the concept of the bourgeois as natural. Whereas New Criticism 
tends to focus on a psychological analysis of character - although in both 
instances this emphasis is ostensibly denied. In Barthes' criticism this denial is 
achieved by a focus on the machinery of the five codes, and in New Critical 
analysis by the emphasis on practical criticism. 
Like Empson, Barthes uses the five codes to justify his criticism -- to 
claim that it is rational, logical, and thus right -- to hide his assumptions, and to 
present conclusions based on these assumptions as conclusions arrived at as 
the result of a particular (methodical) means of analysis. In other words, the 
insights into the text are more the result of Barthes' mind than his division of 
the text into lexias, which are then classified with reference to one or more of 
the five codes. 
But bourgeois criticism triumphs over Barthes' approach. Barthes 
attempts to formulate a criticism beyond the bourgeois end up looking very 
similar to bourgeois criticism -- both its emphasis on close reading and on the 
values the reader holds whilst reading a text. Like Empson, Barthes is 
concerned with making value judgmeAts, But these judgmei\|-s are not made 
in relation to a particular work, as in Empson's case (that is, to distinguish 
good from bad poetry), but in relation to a particular society. Again, like 
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Empson, these are not displayed as value judgnf>e,A+5, but as the result of an 
impartial analysis using the five codes as analytical tools. At the same time, 
Barthes intersperses StZ with comments as to his beliefs about the nature of 
the world, reinforcing the "results" obtained by his tools. But despite these 
judgments the resulting criticism is also consumer based, consuming the text in 
order to produce a justification of a particular ideology. And despite Barthes' 
claim that his five codes open the text, in fact they are used to close it, to limit 
its range of meaning so that the text, too, may constitute a weapon in the 
"battle" against bourgeois criticism, being an example of the "fascist" nature of 
the bourgeoisie. In claiming to free texts, Roland Barthes becomes their 
dictator. 
79 
A Comparison of Harold Bloom's 
Shelley's Mythmaking 
and 
Poetry and Repression 
In Seven Types of Ambiguity Empson attempts to unify his shifting 
focus on reader, author, and text by using the machinery of ambiguity. In a 
similar fashion Bloom uses Freudianism in Poetry and Repression and the 
concept of relationship in Shelley's Mythmaking as the basis for developing a 
philosophy of textuality (the phenomenon of reading and writing). 
All three critics recognise that authors, critics, all work within literary 
language — but it is how they come to terms with it that differs dramatically. 
Barthes, rebelling against the bourgeois context of the classic text, attempts to 
re-produce it and fails. Empson's approach is subtler, trying to alter the way 
in which readers think about texts and their relationship with them. Whereas 
Bloom concludes that all the poet can do is re-write other poetry - "a strong 
poem is a fresh start, such a start is a starting again,"30. Furthermore, "poems 
themselves are acts of reading." {P&R, p. 26). A poem deals with both itself 
and its precursor poems, striving midst interpretations to answer earlier 
interpretations, only to be dealt with by later interpretations {P&R, p. 26). 
^ORarold Bloom, Poetry and Repression: Revisionism from Blake to Stevens New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1976), p. 3. From this point all page references to the 
pieces of Bloom's criticism under consideration will follow quotations or references m 
brackets. To distinguish between references to either work Poetry and Repression will be 
referred to as P&R and Shelley's Mythmaking will be referred to as SM. All italics in 
quotations will be Bloom's unless otherwise noted. 
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At first glance Shelley's Mythmaking and Poetry and Repression 
appear to be fundamentally different responses to the question of how a poem 
is to be read. One could argue that in Shelley's Mythmaking Harold Bloom 
maintains that a poem is to be read in the light of the relationship it reveals 
between the poet and the world. The condition of relationship is contrasted 
with that of experience, each being two fundamentally different ways of 
situating oneself in the world. Whereas in Poetry and Repression the 
emphasis is not on the relationship between the poet and the world, but on how 
a poet tries to revise the world by repressing his/her precursors. It is also 
worth focussing on the differences in Bloom's criticism between the two 
works - there is a shift in emphasis from being a poet to becoming a poet, 
from myth to process. At the same time both works display a fundamental 
similarity, relying on an aesthetics grounded in mythology (Freudianism, 
Gnosticism) on which to base observations regarding Romantic poetry. 
Both texts may be seen as redemptive of unfashionable philosophies 
(using the term loosely). Freudianism has been discredited by much of the 
psychiatric community and yet Freudian myths (e.g. the Oedipus complex, the 
"formation" of a person's psyche by some definitive, often traumatic, 
childhood event) are remarkably persistent. Bloom's emphasis on Gnosticism 
in Shelley's Mythmaking occurred at a time when New Criticism was in the 
ascendent -- Bloom's use of Buber was hardly "mainstream". In this chapter I 
will explore Bloom's use of both mythological systems to define the 
relationship between reader and text, critic and text, and poet and text. 
It is within these mythological frameworks that Bloom's major concerns 
are situated: the quest for originality (involving repression of precursors) and 
the aesthetic redemption of the experience of relationship (as opposed to the 
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experience of experience - the fallen state). It is through the interaction of 
myth and critical concerns that Bloom's criticism yields its greatest insights 
into the workings of Romantic (and, in particular, Shelley's) poetry. But this 
is also the source of Bloom's failings as a critic. 
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I. 
Context and text, experience and myth, reading and misreading -- these 
juxtapositions are central to Bloom's criticism. A poem is misread despite the 
fact that we are bom into a universe of words whose context has already been 
given: 
Any poet (meaning even Homer, if we could know enough 
about his precursors) is in the position of being "after the 
Event," in terms of literary language. His art is necessarily 
an aftering, and so at best he strives for a selection, through 
repression, out of the traces of the language of poetry; that is, 
he represses some of the traces, and remembers others. This 
remembering is a misprision, or creative misreading, but no 
matter how strong a misprision, it cannot achieve an 
autonomy of meaning, or a meaning fully present, that is, 
free from all literary context. Even the strongest poet must 
take up his stance within literary language. If he stands 
outside it, then he cannot begin to write poetry. (P&R, p. 
4). 
The battle is not just carried on amongst poets, but also amongst critics. 
Canonization, the creation of a pantheon of hero-texts, is seen as a necessary 
misreading of texts. "As the poem itself begins to be misread . . . its 
meanings do change drastically between the time that it first wrestles its way 
into strength, and the later time that follows its canonization." (P&R, p. 28). 
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Yet curiously enough the focus is on the misreading, not the process leading to 
it. How a text's meaning comes to change is not clearly dealt with by Bloom. 
The focus instead is on the relationship between the meanings and the universe 
which the poem would forge. All poetry is belated in that it must use created 
meanings, "no matter how strong a misprision, it cannot achieve an autonomy 
of meaning, . . . that is, free from all literary context." (P&R, p. 4). 
Although a poet can envy a predecessor's relative freedom to create meanings, 
"creative envy . . . [can become] the ecstasy, the Sublime . ." (P&R, 
p. 5). Furthermore, although all poetry relies on created meanings, "belated 
poems suffer an increasing overdetermination in language, but an increasing 
under-determination in meaning." (P&R, p. 134). That is, the more history 
behind the language, the less meaning (however defined). In strong poems we 
are forced to "invent if we are to read w e l l . . . " (P&R, p. 140) - it is this 
which allows the reader to misread, to invent meanings, to engage in the 
necessity of misreading. 
Bloom insists that poetic strength requires a "double distortion, a 
distortion of the precursors and so of tradition, and a self-distortion in 
compensation." (P&R, p. 130). He argues that "There is no growth in poetic 
strength without a radical act of interpretation that is always a distortion or 
misprision . . . ." (P&R, p. 130). A fixation on a precursor or several 
precursors affords the poet's ego cause for repression, thus allowing the poet 
to feel the anxiety of influence. It is this anxiety, "this strange idea of identity-
and-opposition" (P&R, p. 144), that causes the poet to attempt strong poetry, 
poetry to transcend that of the precursor(s). However, usually the poetry that 
is produced simply shows how the precursor has created the poet (see P&R, 
pp. 144-45). 
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Furthermore, even if the later poet triumphs over his/her precursors, s/he 
still cannot avoid the basic principle of misprision (i.e. of revision) -- "No later 
poet can be the fulfillment of any earlier poet. He can be the reversal of the 
precursor, or the deformation of the precursor, but whatever he is, to revise is 
not to fulfill." (P&R, p. 88).31 
So to our original trilogy of juxtapositions -- context and text, experience 
and myth, reading and misreading ~ we can add a fourth, vision and revision. 
Originality is redefined as a secondary, redefinitional event. Fulfillment, 
transcendence of the precursor, vision can rarely be achieved by the text-bound 
poet. Each poet's defences against precursor poets do not liberate but instead 
bind the poet. The quest for vision falls into revision and repression. 
A poet, according to Bloom, requires a poetic father against which to 
defend himself. The degree of repression of a poetic father, which is the major 
form of defence, can be judged between different poems "by a comparison of 
estrangement, distortion, and malforming, in tropes and images." (P&R, p. 
233): 
in poetic texts, the poet's (or his surrogate's) psychic 
defenses are best understood as tropes, for they trope or turn 
against anterior defenses, against previous or outworn 
postures of the spirit. {P&R, p. 124). 
31Compare this statement to the general tenor of Harold Bloom's The Anxiety of Influence: 
A Theory of Poetry (New York: Oxford University Press, l9Ti), passim. 
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Presumably the images distorted are those of the father-poet. One trope 
is related to another systematically by its function as defence, "defense against 
everything that threatens survival, and a defense whose aptest name is 
'mean ing ' . " { P & R , p. 240). Repression "is . . . a ratio of 
representation . . . because in poetic repression you forget something in 
order to present something else." {P&R, p. 240). Whereas in the case of 
sublimation, a ratio of limitation, "you remember something (concentrate it) in 
order to avoid presenting that something, and you choose to present something 
else in its place." (P&R, p. 240). 
Repression is a term with which we have become familiar due to Freud. 
But the concept of repression with which Bloom works is not strictly 
Freudian. Indeed, it cannot be because, as Bloom notes, "On a strict Freudian 
view, a good poem is a sublimation, and not a repression." (P&R, p. 25). 
Bloom fixes the origin of a poem in repression, using this fixation to formulate 
his understanding of discourse. That he makes the basis of poetic creation the 
Freudian (pre-Freudian, really) Oedipal myth is interesting. The notion of 
renewal via death of the father figure is not new to literature, from Pre-
Christian tales of the death of Winter and the renewal of man in Spring, the 
myth of the phoenix, to the The Tin Drum. The concept of usurpation of the 
father figure as a source of renewal and creativity is one of literature's 
strongest myths. Like a strong poem, myths built upon it cannot be considered 
a fulfillment of the earlier myth, only a revision. 
For Bloom a good poem is a repression and not a sublimation (see P&R, 
p. 25). But although a poem's subject may be repression of its precursor(s), 
"To say that a poem's tme subject is its repression of the precursor poem is not 
to say that the later poem reduces to the process of that repression." (P&R, p. 
86 
25). Despite Bloom's interest in the genesis of a poem via repression he 
accepts that there is more to a poem than repression of a precursor. Thus he 
goes on to note that creative "freedom" (in which he does not believe, but 
acknowledges that poets often do) must be repressed by an "initial fixation of 
influence" in order to become a poet {P&R, p. 27). In order to become a poet 
one must therefore remember to forget, that is, to repress. But this has its 
price, which differs for each poet. 
The poetic equivalent of repression is "the Sublime or the Counter-
Sublime of a belated daemonization . . . " (presumably of the precursor) 
{P&R, p. 26). The result is a set of schemes of transformation. Let us briefly 
examine Bloom's schematic terminology — the key items and concepts in his 
theory of reading and making. 
A poem starts with clinamen, "a swerve or step inside" (P&R, p. 18), 
and then moves to tessera, "an antithetical completion that necessarily fails to 
complete, and so is less than a full extemalization" {P&R, p. 18). From this 
point strong modem poets pass into a kenosis, a: 
'humbling' or emptying out Kenosis subsumes the 
trope of metonymy, the imagistic reduction from a prior 
fullness to a later emptiness, and the three parallel Freudian 
defenses of regression, undoing, and isolating, all of them 
repetitive and compulsive movements of the psyche. {P&R, 
p. 18). 
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Daemonization is seen as marking the climax or sublime crisis point of a 
strong poem, subsuming repression and accumulating the Freudian notion of 
Unconscious. "As trope, poetic repression tends to appear as an exaggerated 
representat ion. . ." {P&R, p. 18). However, 
The dialectics of revisionism compel the strong poem into a 
final movement against ratios, one that sets space against 
time, space as a metaphor of limitation and time as a 
restituting metalepsis or transumption, a trope that murders 
all previous tropes. {P&R, p. 19). 
This is askesis, which "subsumes metaphor, the defense of sublimation, 
and the dualistic imagery of inside consciousness against outside 
nature . . . ." {P&R, p. 19). Then there is a final breaking-of-the-vessels 
of Romantic figuration, in which a substitution takes place. Bloom has named 
this movement apophrades: 
Defensively, this poetic final movement is frequently a 
balance between introjection (or identification) and projection 
(or casting-out the forbidden). Imagistically, the balance is 
between earliness and belatedness, and there are very few 
strong poems that do not attempt, somehow, to conclude by 
introjecting an earliness and projecting the affliction of 
belatedness. The trope involved is the unsettling one 
anciently called metalepsis or transumption, the only trop-
reversing trope, since it substitutes one word for another in 
early figurations . . . . 
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Metalepsis . . . becomes a total, final act of taking up a 
poetic stance in relation to anteriority, particularly to the 
anteriority of poetic language, which means primarily the 
loved-and-feared poems of the precursors. Properly 
accomplished, this stance figuratively produces the illusion 
of hav ing f a t h e r e d o n e ' s own f a t h e r s , 
. . . the . . . illusion [of] poetic immortality. (P&R, p. 
20). 
It could be argued that Bloom has followed a similar pattern in his own 
critical development, swerving from Frye and Abrams,^^ ^yt i would not like 
to guess his current stage of development. Still, it is clear that Bloom's 
criticism in Poetry and Repression is based on the concept of self-defmition.^^ 
At any point in the process of self-defmition the poet may fail in the attempt to 
become his/her precursor, instead remaining a weak poet, becoming a 
forgotten poet. Bloom argues that it is this fear of failure that consciously or 
unconsciously drives poets to rebel against their poetic fathers, to attempt 
strong poetry. Bloom's terminology, his map of misreading, is grounded in a 
mythology of renewal via death, of rebellion as a secret acknowledgement of 
authority. 
32For notes on Bloom's precursors see McFarland, op. cit., pp. 424,431, and also Frank 
Lentricchia, rev. of Poetry and Repression: Revisionism from Blake to Stevens, by Harold 
Bloom, Modern ILanguage Quarterly, 38, No. 1 (1977), p. 110, and Ulrich Horstman, "The 
Over-Reader: Harold Bloom's Neo-Darwinian Revisionism," Poetics, 12, No. 2/3 (1983), p. 
140. 
33charles Molesworth, "Promethean Narcissism," rev. of Agon: Towards a Theory of 
Revisionism snA The Breaking of the Vessels, by Harold Bloom, F a r / w a n v i e w , 51, No. 
1 (1984), p. 156. 
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II. 
In Poetry and Repression Bloom claims the aim of the poet is to become 
the precursor of his/her precursor, whereas in Shelley's Mythmaking the 
poem is seen as the vehicle for the poet's achieving a state of relationship with 
the universe and/or exploring that state. Relationship is defined as a 
redemptive experience, whereas experience is seen as a mode of existence 
without aesthetic values, and therefore an existence which denies-redemption. 
In Poetry and Repression Bloom writes of poets as trying to create new ways 
of seeing by "dating" and "predating" (and, for that matter, being the predator 
of) earlier visions, whereas in the earlier work Bloom is more concerned with 
the poet's creation of a vision of society, with relatively little reference to pre-
existing visions. 
The ostensible crux of Bloom's approach to poetry in Shelley's 
Mythmaking is his concept of mythopoeia (and therefore of mythopoeic 
poetry). Bloom distinguishes between mythological, mythographic, and 
mythopoeic poetry. Mythographic poetry "is aware not only of the existence 
of different mythologies but also of the element of parallelism between 
mythologies." (SM, p. 5). Mythological poetry "is unicultural, or at least 
unitraditional. Exactly where mythological poetry becomes mythopoeic it is 
impossible to say " (5M, p. 5). Bloom then goes on to divide 
mythopoeic aspects of poetry into three parts. The most creative kind of 
mythological poetry is where the poet uses "a given mythology but extends its 
range of significance without violating it in spirit, or even very much in letter." 
{SM, p. 5). Primitive mythopoeic poetry "embodies that direct perception of a 
Thou in natural objects or phenomena " {SM, p. 5). It often owes 
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nothing to past mythology. But there is a third variety of mythopoeic poetry 
with its roots in primitive mythopoeic poetry, where the poet formulates his 
own abstractions rather than using those that already exist in myths. Bloom 
claims that this is the kind of mythopoeia to be found in Shelley's major works 
(see SM, pp. 5-6). 
There is more to the concept of mythopoeia than is apparent from this 
brief outline. Bloom relies heavily on Martin Buber's conception of one's 
relationship with the world, formulated in relation to the Old Testament and 
other Jewish theological writings. Buber distinguishes between two "primary 
words," I-Thou and I-It (SM, p. Ij. Buber explains succinctly: 
When Thou is spoken, the speaker has no thing for his 
object. For where there is a thing there is another thing. 
Every It is bounded by others; It exists only through being 
bounded by others. But when Thou is spoken, there is no 
thing. Thou has no bounds.34 
Bloom concludes that there are two I's: one of relationship, and the other 
of Itness or experience. In the first instance, the relationship to the Thou is 
direct.35 "The world of our ancestors, or of contemporary primitives, is one 
of relation and not of experience." (SM, p. 2). It involves perceiving time as 
"qualitative and concrete, not quandtative and a b s t r a c t . The Thou is known 
only to the extent that it desires to reveal itself (SM, p. 4). In a mythopoeic 
^Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (Edinburgh: Clark; New York: 
Scribner; 1937), pp. 4-5; in SM, p. 1. 
^^Ibid., p. 1; SM, p. 2. 
36Henri Frankfort et al. Before Philosophy (London: Penguin, 1949), p. 32; in SM. p. 4. 
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poem "there is no consciousness of an inanimate world, personification can 
have no place, for there is no It to be worked upon, no phenomena to be 
experienced." {SM, p. 73). The primal act of mythopoeia is the "passing from 
the first primary word [I-It] to the second [I-Thou] . . . " {SM, p. 88). 
Bloom believes that it is: 
the will of a human or any sentient being to stand in relation 
to all that is sentient and to what is the ground of all that is 
sentient, as an I confronting a Thou rather than an I 
experiencing an It. {SM, p. 89). 
Bloom claims that it makes sense to consider Shelley's poetry in the light of 
Buber's concept of the relationship between man and the world because it 
makes clear that Shelley was not a confused philosopher who had conflicting 
philosophical and psychological ideas, but a more consistent thinker. He feels 
that "Judged in the context of mythopoeia . . . what seems to be a welter of 
conflicting philosophical and psychological notions may be seen to emerge into 
a clearer and more consistent outline." {SM, p. 90). 
Relationship is a precarious state which cannot simply be willed into 
existence, "Will and grace are needed . . . " {SM, p. 95), that is, one must 
also be in a fit state to be in a relationship with the world, rather than to 
experience it as something merely external to oneself. But relationship is more 
than a special way of experiencing nature. It is of a higher order, and 
something that the individual initiates. Therefore if one can experience 
relationship, which "is not to be found in nature, and is of an order of reality 
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higher than the order of nature." {SM, p. 115), one can experience a particular 
vision of society, and achieve a superior state of being. And yet the pursuit of 
this experience in the hope of changing one's perception to relationship, to this 
state of being permanently, in the hope of perceiving oneself in relation to the 
world as part of an organic whole, is hopeless because one lives in the natural 
world. One cannot sustain one's existence by thinking entirely in terms of 
relationship because we are all members of the natural world and therefore 
cannot always be available to be confronted in relationship as a Thou (see SM, 
p. 3). 
The state of Innocence, to use one of Blake's terms (which Bloom often 
does, but more of this later) is the state of relationship, of having no objects 
and not being an object, of encountering not an object, but a being. To be an 
object of love -- that is, to take rather than give love -- is not to be in 
relationship, but merely to experience. Consider the Sensitive Plant in 
Shelley's poem of that name - "Because it does not stand in relation, it 
becomes an object of love, and in that reduction from relationship to 
experience is presaged its destruction." (SM, p. 158). So although one 
aspires to the state of relationship it is difficult to achieve and maintain. 
Indeed, being members of a world of experience, the natural world, we cannot 
hope to maintain this state of being, thus the ideal vision of society is not 
permanently attainable according to Bloom in Shelley's Mythmaking . It is 
something which can be used to guide the world as it exists to a superior state. 
It is in this sense that Bloom's ideal vision of society may be described as 
Utopian. However, his vision of society itself, the state of experience, is not 
Utopian. Neither Barthes nor Empson treat their own visions of society as 
Utopian constructs which cannot be attained. Both outline a program for 
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permanent change, whereas Bloom can (by his own admission) only outline a 
means of temporarily changing one's perspective - and that means is called 
"relationship". 
Relationship is important for the poet because it is the state in which he 
can create. Being in a state of relationship and being inspired are but different 
facets of the same state - "The all but inaccessible Power, the secret Strength 
of things, available momentarily to the poet in his perceptive trance, 
is . . . the Thou of mythic relationship." (SM, p. 36). And when one is in 
relationship things appear "infinite" - one encounters an object or person not 
as something to be experienced, likQ a piece of chicken that one buys merely to 
eat or savour, but as "a 'single whole,'" as something that requires more than 
superficial attention (SM, p. 163). It is an encounter involving the whole of 
the self. 
"But love (the sensible love of the emotions) does not unify; it unites in 
act, but it does not unite in essence." (SM, p. 219). This is the countermyth. 
When one denies the possibility of relationship by denying the possibility of 
unification one falls back into the world of experience. The precarious nature 
of any attainment of this type of society, of thinking, is in strong contrast with 
Barthes' and Empson's attempts to permanentlyo*t-er modes of thought, ways 
of thinking and seeing. 
The mode of operation of Bloom's concept of mythopoeia is for the poet 
"to strive to do away with It's [sic], with objects of experience, with 
experiencing and being experienced itself." (SM, pp. 184-85). So, in a sense, 
the poet can be said to be trying to alter reality, the fact of experience, by the 
attempt to be in a state of relationship (even though this attempt is doomed to 
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failure). It could be argued that in Poetry and Repression the poet is not trying 
to alter reality, but the fact that language is given, that the universe in which he 
wishes to posit his thoughts has already been created, and that he must position 
his poem in relation to the other poems that have already formed its structure. 
The implication is that change to the nature of discourse is possible, but usually 
only minute change, subject to misprision, and necessarily bound by the nature 
of the existing state of affairs. 
To return to Shelley's Mythmaking, if being in relationship with other 
objects is so difficult to achieve, so precarious, and bound to fail, why not 
simply be in relationship with oneself? After all, this would seem to be a far 
easier state to achieve. But "Communion of an I with an I is selfhood-
communion, destructive of all relationship . . . abominated by the gods and 
by God." {SM, p. 211). Bloom claims that this is the opinion of the Greeks 
and the Jews. Presumably their opinion has weight because together they 
created most of the myths on which Westem man still relies. He also claims 
that Shelley was aware that love of the self, and therefore greed, was 
something to which poetry was and is opposed, "an opposition analogous to 
Blake's cosmic war of Imagination against Selfhood " {SM, pp. 229-
30). 
Because the poet is in a unique position to mediate between the world of 
relationship and that of experience, his poetry must be able to be 
comprehended in terms of both worlds. This may often lead to an apparent 
confusion of metaphors due to the presence of two levels of apprehension 
expressed by one metaphor, but these "dichotomies . . . are 
resolved . . . into a clear relation . . . " between the levels of apprehension 
(SM, p. 23). Yet because all images are bound, finite, they belong to the 
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universe of It. Redemptive experience is both accessible and inaccessible, 
"Implicit in the myths of Shelley's major poems [for example] is a realization 
that the limitations of this existence mark the human condition as fallen." {SM, 
p. 252). 
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III. 
Relationship and vision, experience and repression -- the difference 
between the two texts is that the way in which the universe is characterised has 
altered. By the time Bloom came to write Poetry and Repression he no longer 
considered the universe to be something with which one can enter into 
relationship, but rather a heritage which one fights to dominate (it is also a fight 
to define oneself). In Poetry and Repression the concept of relationship has 
become irrelevant. Indeed, it receives only passing mention. There is a brief 
note that a poem "is not even so much a relationship between entities, as it is a 
relationship between relationships, or a Peircean Idea of Thirdness . . . . " 
(P&R, p. 99). That is all. And this note is made only in order to make 
another point - that one cannot speak of finished or unfinished poems because 
one cannot reify "poems from relationships into entities" (P&R, p. 99), cannot 
speak of finished or unfinished relationships, only of strong or weak 
relationships, and thus of strong or weak poems. Bloom thinks that "a modem 
poem is a triad, which is why it begins in a dialectical alternation of presence 
and absence, and why it ends in a transumptive interplay of earliness and 
lateness." (P&R, p. 99). Another mention of relationship is made in an 
explanation of the state of the ephebe, who if s/he recognises that older poems 
influence and motivate him/her and turns from this, could then surrender 
him/herself to knowledge, but at the price of being foreign to all relation, 
including influence. By contemplation of these poems' deepest meaning 
(which would be a misprision) the ephebe will reach "the state of the Sublime" 
{P&R, p. 286). 
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The major difference in attitude between Poetry and Repression and 
Shelley's Mythmaking is the degree and nature of belief in the likelihood of 
failure. Bloom would seem to be saying in Poetry and Repression that once 
one agrees to enter the universe of discourse as a poet one is doomed to suffer 
the anxiety of influence, to be weaker than a precursor (with rare exceptions). 
In other words, few alternate visions are likely to become accepted. Whereas 
although in Shelley's Mythmaking Innocence is something the world will 
inevitably shatter, it "is not a world where any of us can long abide" (SM, p. 
153), and no amount of hunting for relationship can force it to become one's 
state of existence, "each Thou we attempt to grasp becomes only another veil 
of itness . . . " (SM, p. 126) -- a relationship of I-Thou rather than I-It 
with the world can be achieved sporadically, and is a repeatable experience. 
For Bloom also insists that it is possible after the collapse from relationship 
into the world of experience to move back into the world of relationship, which 
he sees as another important aspect of Shelley's mythopoeic poetry (see SM, 
pp. 3, 122). Indeed, it is necessary for the individual to move back into 
relationship. Although he claims that Shelley recognises that the Thou of the 
beloved, the Thou in relation to which the lover attempts to take up his stand, 
"becomes for him an It also. The relational event quickly runs its 
course . . . " {SM, p. 184). So one is forced continually to shuttle between 
the state of relationship (or Innocence) and that of Itness (or Experience).^^ 
But in the short term, at least, defeat is the culmination of the myth, thus 
" 'The Triumph of Life ' . . . commemorates the triumph of the 'It' of 
experience." {SM, p. 275). 
As Buber also noted, see footnote 5. 
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Defeat is the culmination of Bloom's own myth of the way in which 
poets write poetry in Poetry and Repression. Being a weak poet means that 
one is perpetually dominated by one's poetic father(s), and one perpetually 
fails to attain a different vision of society. The best most poets can hope to do 
is win a little space for themselves in which they can alter language and appear 
"original." 
Thus in both texts we have a criticism of failure. In Poetry and 
Repression it is possible, rarely, to avoid failure - by misreading, troping 
oneself into lateness. In Shelley's Mythmaking failure can be avoided only 
temporarily. In both texts poets struggle against the world, against existing 
visions, and in both texts reality is, practically, unchangeable. It is this 
negative approach to his own polemics that most distinguishes Bloom from 
Empson and Barthes. For the latter still believe in the possibility of change as 
progress, in the achievability of a better state which is outlined in their own 
criticism; whereas Bloom believes in change simply as an expression of 
rebellion, not of success. 
The mythopoeic poet, as described in Shelley's Mythmaking, is a 
religious poet, "who formulates his religion by the actual writing of his poems, 
the making of his myths " (5M, p. 67). In the case of Shelley, Bloom 
argues that his myth-making was in opposition to the myth-making of the 
Judaeo-Christian religion. So mythopoeia is seen as an attempt to supplant 
religion by the creation of a different vision of life through the creation of 
myth. It sets out to compete "with religion and philosophy as a discipline 
apprehending reality." (5M, p. 174). And this religion demands the existence 
of the pole of Itness as well as that of relationship, thus without the former 
verse and, presumably, life are inferior, for we are the creatures of the world 
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of experience. Although "the mode of operation of mythopoeia . . . [is] to 
strive to do away with It's [sic], with objects of experience, with experiencing 
and being experienced . . . " {SM, pp. 184-85), mythopoeia cannot operate 
without a tacit acknowledgement that we experience the world rather than are in 
relation to it. An important aspect of the existence of this dialectic between It 
and Thou, between which the poet continually moves, is that "you do not enter 
into relationship with a dialectic, but instead you are merely subject to it." (SM, 
p. 122). 
Bloom's concern with the process of the creation of myth, which 
involves telling a story about origins and consequences, can be related to a 
desire to be considered a seer, one who sees the true nature of things. In 
Shelley's Mythmaking Bloom wishes to convince the reader of his vision. It 
is not reality that he wishes to alter, but rather the reader's perception of reality. 
By comparison, in Poetry and Repression the poet is not a maker, but an 
explorer. The most extreme stance that a poet can take is not the stance of 
creator, but the prospective stance, although "No strong poet, of necessity, is 
wholly liminal in his vision " {P&R, p. 112). The origin of poetry 
according to Vico is "in the complex defensive trope . . . called 
'divination'" {P&R, p. 3). And Bloom develops this notion in the light of 
his conception of the poem as self-exploration. Vico has argued that one can 
"only know what we ourselves have made . . . " {P&R, p. 5), and thus to 
know oneself one must have made oneself. "To know is to have become 
belated; not to know . . . is to become early again, however self-
deceivingly." {P&R, pp. 159-60). So poetic images, tropes, defences, "are 
all forms of a ratio between human ignorance making things out of itself, and 
human self-identification moving to transform us into the things we have 
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made." (P&R, p. 8). Given Bloom's notion "that the origin of any defense is 
its stance towards death " (P&R, p. 10), derived from Freud and Vico 
combined, then "death is the most proper or literal of meanings, and literal 
meaning partakes of death." {P&R, p. 10). Yet poetry also contains the germ 
of self-preservation against the truth -- the imagination (see P&R, p. 25). 
The concepts both of relationship and repression which are used as the 
guiding themes of the two Bloom works being discussed can be seen as two 
sides of the same desire - the desire to create a new vision of society by 
eradicating an old one, characterising any remnants thereof as weak, unworthy 
of attention. In this sense, then. Bloom's criticism is similar to that of Barthes 
and Empson, for both desire to create new visions of society; not by repression 
but rather by replacement. Barthes desires to replace a bourgeois vision of 
society - not so much to eradicate it as to supercede it, and Empson to replace 
certain mental habits with others. However, according to Bloom it is one's 
perception of society that may change, society itself is untouchable, and any 
replacement of one vision with another is not possible without repression. It is 
this belief that is the foundation for his theories in Poetry and Repression. 
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IV. 
Repression of the precursor, desire to experience relationship, are not 
automatic events but acts of the will. Underlying such a treatment of poetry is 
a belief that a poem has an author. This can be compared with the beUef held 
by many that the opinion of the author is irrelevant, the work must stand on its 
own. It is, in effect, without an author.38 Thus one's focus is on the text, the 
text as akeady read. For Bloom to consider what Shelley did, whether he read 
Coleridge before he wrote a poem (see SM, p. 11) implies a belief that 
Shelley's opinions of his poetry are relevant. Yet at a later stage Bloom says 
of "Prometheus Unbound," "Whatever Shelley the man may have believed 
about e v i l . . . is of slight importance to my study compared with what 
Shelley's poem believes and communicates." {SM, p. 95). Bloom later 
distinguishes between "Shelley the man" and "Shelley the poet," arguing that 
this was a distinction which Shelley himself recognised (the man or the poet?) 
and that only the opinions of the latter, who was not "afflicted by the limiting 
prejudices of the revolutionary intelligentsia of his own age . . . " {SM, p. 
102), are relevant to the interpretation of Shelley's poetry. Yet how we are to 
distinguish between the two is not clear. And often the distinction is not 
apparent in Bloom's writing, for he sometimes assumes the two are one. For 
example, to say that "Shelley [believed] only in myth itself {SM, p. 124) 
begs the question -- the man or the poet? This confusion is especially apparent 
when he discusses his interpretation of a section of "The Sensitive Plant," 
commenting "1 am aware that Shelley may not consciously have intended such 
a meaning, but I cannot see that Shelley's intention is of any primary 
38See Roland Barthes, 5/Z (Trans. Richard Miller, London: Jonathon Cape, 1974), pp. 1-
15. 
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importance in this." {SM, p. 158). Is it "Shelley the man" whose intentions 
are iirelevant or "Shelley the poet"? Or is it that both are iirelevant, and that the 
author is irrelevant in the interpretation of his work? And yet three pages later 
he talks of the poem in terms of Shelley's "confrontation o f . . . [the] world 
as a Thou." {SM, p. 161). Does this mean that Shelley (the poet? the man?) is 
the protagonist of the poem, and therefore his opinions and intentions are 
relevant? 
Sometimes the events that have occurred to Shelley (the man) are 
considered important, for example. Bloom thinks that "Biographical fact is 
necessary for a complete approach to the 'Epipsychidion ' . . . " {SM, p. 
205), a poem which was developed from Shelley's experiences. And yet on 
the following page he again distinguishes between "Shelley the man" and 
"Shelley the poet," arguing that Shelley's prose cannot be used in explication 
of his poetry (except his Defense of Poetry, which Bloom finds "more a 
visionary poem about poetry than . . . a reasoned argument" {SM, p. 206), 
though why this is the case is never explained). But then it is unclear how one 
is to treat a biographical poem like "Epipsychidion." The confusion is 
compounded when two pages later Bloom talks of the poem as "a private and 
not a public performance." {SM, p. 208). Private for the man, presumably, 
not the poet. But only a few pages ago we were told that "Shelley the man" 
was irrelevant. Later, when dealing with "The Triumph of Life," Bloom 
breaks his own "rule" of not considering other prose writings by Shelley to use 
his Proposals for an Association, etc. (1812) and a letter to Peacock to 
discover Shelley's (presumably "the man's") opinion as a means of elucidating 
his attitude towards Rousseau (see SM, pp. 252-53). 
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A further degree of confusion is added by the distinction between 
"Shelley the poet" and "Shelley the philosopher," the latter being more closely 
associated with "Shelley the man." The confusion seems to imply that the type 
of vision a poet, philosopher, and person (as if these were mutually exclusive!) 
have is different. But Bloom still continues to claim that Shelley's poetry is 
inherently philosophical in so far as it is mythopoeic, for "the mode of 
operation of mythopoeia. . . [is] to strive to do away with It's [sic], with 
objects of experience . . . " (5M, pp. 184-85). That is, it is a philosophical 
stance regarding one's relation to the world. 
Furthermore, Bloom also makes it unclear whether he thinks Shelley is 
the protagonist of his own poems. He thinks of the wind as being a Thou for 
Shelley (presumably the protagonist) in the "Ode to the West Wind" (see SM, 
p. 87), or of Shelley as the protagonist led by Rousseau in "The Triumph of 
Life," as Dante was led by Virgil (see SM, pp. 255, 260). But within the 
poems themselves there is no clear indication or even hint that this is the case 
(an exception being "Epipsychidion"). 
The degree to which a consideration of the opinion of Shelley "the man" 
or "the poet" (and how to separate the two is, as already noted, also unclear) is 
relevant to the poetry is unclear. One is left wondering what Bloom means 
whenever he refers to Shelley. And when he notes that in Shelley's myth 
"once on the page a poem is an It." {SM, p. 200), one wonders where Shelley 
said or wrote this (or something like it), and whether it is a reference to 
"Shelley the poet" or "Shelley the philosopher," and in either case how could it 
change the elucidation of the poem? Such questions are barely acknowledged, 
let alone answered. 
104 
In Poetry and Repression, too, the implication is that the author is 
important. Indeed, the author is usually considered to be the protagonist of the 
poem, unless this is clearly not the case. Then, however, the protagonist is 
seen as a poet, and thus the state of the poet who wrote the poem is explored. 
Thus Bloom calls Tennyson's Mariana a "poetess" without any proof from 
within the poem that this is the case {P&R, p. 151). If the protagonist clearly 
cannot be considered to be a poet, then he/she is seen as representing an aspect 
of Romantic poetry. Thus Tennyson's Percivale is seen as the High Romantic 
quester, whose journey is necessarily one in search of self, just as "Spenser's 
Colin Clout. . . and the equivocal heroism of Satan questing onwards 
through Chaos to reach Eden . . . " {P&R, pp. 168-69) can also be said to 
be in search of self. Indeed, this is seen as the paradigm of all journeys of 
discovery undertaken by poets. 
The author's aims are also considered important. Thus Bloom talks of 
Blake's desire "to keep origin and aim, source and purpose, as far apart as 
possible." {P&R, p. 44). Or comments on Tintern Abbey as being "a very 
different poem than the one he [i.e. Wordsworth] set out to write." {P&R, p. 
56), And also notes that Browning "could never bear . . . a sense of 
purposelessness " {P&R, p. 192), and yet it is this sense of purposelessness 
that shadows his poetry (see P&R, pp. 192-93). He considers the poet's 
beliefs and desires to be important, thus he finds it worth mentioning that 
Wordsworth and Coleridge both "longed for a composite, originary sense that 
combined rather than opposed seeing and hearing." {P&R, p. 57). Yeats' 
relation to Gnosticism is also examined in some detail (see P&R, pp. 206ff). 
He also uses details of the poet's life to explicate his poems - so he considers 
Wordsworth's relationship with Dorothy when discussing Tintern Abbey 
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(P&R, pp. 77-78). This interest also extends to what the poet read. Thus 
Shelley is considered to be a weak poet until "he read deeply in Wordsworth 
and Coleridge, particularly Wordsworth . . . " (P&R, p. 105), for only 
then did he find his poetic "father." These are but a few examples that clearly 
indicate that Bloom's belief in the existence of the author as a member of 
society, existing in a cultural milieu, and the importance of the author's ideas in 
the explication of his poetry. The illogical division between "x-the-man," "X-
the-poet," and "x-the-philosopher" that was to be found in Shelley's 
Mythmaking has been dropped. 
But when a poet does not cle^ly fit into Bloom's concept of the poet, he 
then decides that he really does conform to the pattern, but hides it well. 
Browning, known by all his friends to be jovial, without "the slightest 
personal consciousness of an anxiety of influence . . . " {P&R, p. 177), is 
considered none the less to have the "disease," for how else could he have 
written as he did? It is Bloom's refusal to consider that his theory might be 
wrong, the way in which it is made to account for all poets in all 
circumstances, that makes one suspicious of it. Consider the idea mentioned 
earlier that all poets suffer from repression and when they deny this they are 
simply engaging in yet a further act of repression -- "representing 
[their] own anxieties about anteriority, and [their] . . . rhetoric belies 
the fact of a belated poet's deepest fear, which is that increasingly we do 
become all too much alike." {P&R, p. 278). 
It seems so easy to give poets poetic fathers. So, taking just the High 
Romantic poets, Wordsworth is seen as struggling with Milton (e.g. P&R, 
pp. 65-66, 78, 80-82), Shelley with Wordsworth (e.g. P&R, pp. 98, 107-
11), Tennyson with Keats (e.g. P&R, PP- 147-49), and Keats with 
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Wordsworth (e.g. P&R, pp. 124ff). He seems to have httle difficulty 
mapping the poems in terms of his revisionary ratios,39 the one exception 
being Keats' Hyperion. But this is held to be an unsatisfactory poem because 
too much is attempted in it. Oddly enough, Bloom notes that is is only a 
fragment and has only two ratios -- "a kenosis and a daemonization, in 
uneasy alternation" {P&R, p. 123). If Bloom cannot find the complete 
pattern, then he finds part of it. And in this instance he does not even attempt 
to explain why attempting too much in a poem should result in too little (i.e. in 
what he considers to be a fragment). 
It is not that Bloom's system is inconsistent, it is that it is too consistent. 
It appears to cover all possibilities, account for all poems that are explorations 
of self. Thus Eliot's The Waste Land, which is not a Romantic poem as far as 
Bloom is concerned, can still be said to contain the six revisionary ratios: 
clinamen, or swerve from Donne and the Metaphysical poets, as well as 
Dante, Shakespeare, and a host of other Enlightenment poets; and its 
concommitant, tessera, or "completion" of these other poets as they would 
have written had they lived in modem times; then kenosis, the sense of 
emptiness contrasted with the prior fullness of tradition; daemonization, 
which recurs in images, such as that of the buried corpse, the office clerk, the 
woman at her dressing table, the women in the pub, and so on; askesis, clear 
in the desert scenes and description of Phlebas the Phoenician; and finally 
apophrades, where the balance of age and youth in the last section of the poem 
is set off against notions of earliness and lateness, with which the poem began. 
Although the poem does not contain all these ratios in the neat, ordered form 
that they occur in Romantic poetry, they can still all be found. And if not all 
39E.g. Tintern Abbey, P&R, pp. 223; The Triumph of Life. P&R. pp. 99-100. 
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the ratios can be found, then clearly the poem is but a "fragment."40 Clearly 
Bloom's "system" is hard to disprove because it is so flexible it can be applied 
to any poem. Yet Bloom rejects Enlightenment and Neo-Classical poetry as 
unsuitable for the treatment he provides Romantic poets/i preferring not to 
trace the history of influence in canonical non-Romantic poetry. 
The whole issue of authors and authority is closely tied with the concepts 
of repression and redemption. The author's authority is tied to his/her strength 
(repressive capacity) and the mechanics of the revisionary ratios is just one 
way to map a poet's path to strength in a particular poem. The confusion in 
Shelley's Mythmaking regarding the roles of the author (man, poet, 
philosopher) is replaced by a system of revisionary ratios. I have been 
discussing Bloom's poetics of failure in this chapter with little reliance on the 
proof he evidences by finding ratios in poems. One does not need to talk about 
revisionary ratios in order to trace the influences of previous poems on a poet -
- they have been discussed without any such machinery by critics for quite a 
long time. The purpose of the revisionary ratios is, like Barthes' five codes or 
Empson's seven types of ambiguity, to provide an "objective" piece of 
machinery to "prove" one's beliefs. Similarly, in Shelley's Mythmaking 
Bloom's attempts to show Shelley had a consistent philosophy is part of his 
attempt to "prove" his beliefs. 
40lt could also be argues that Bloom's theory is inadequate because it does not deal with 
Byron or Whitman -- Jerome McGann, "Formahsm, Savagery, and Care; or the Function of 
Criticism One Again." Critical Inquiry. 2 (1975/6), pp. 612-13. Although I disagree with 
his statement that for Byron poetry was only a hobby. 
41paul D. Sheats, Rev. oi Poetry and Repression: Revisionism from Blake to Stevens, by 
Harold Bloom, and Romanticism and Behaviour: Collected Essays. II. by Morse Peckham, 
Keats-Shelley Journal. 27 (1978), p. 144. 
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V . 
What is the role of criticism in Bloom's work? Are there strong and 
weak critics? Can a critic be in relationship to a poem? It is worth noting that 
neither Barthes nor Empson place such reliance upon a particular critic or 
philosopher in their works. Bloom seems to use a particular person's writings 
as a means of gaining legitimacy for his own in much the same way as Empson 
uses the machinery of the seven types of ambiguity and its supposed 
objectivity or, for that matter, the way Barthes uses his five codes, in order to 
"legitimise" an approach to texts and critics, an attitude to life. However, in 
the quest for legitimacy Bloom chooses the arguments of people not in the 
mainstream of literary discourse (i.e. Freud and Buber). It seems Bloom picks 
his predecessor critics so that they will be easy to trope. For it is worth noting 
the role of choice, crucial to whether or not a poet can trope his/her 
predecessors, is never discussed in Poetry and Repression or Shelley's 
Mythmaking. Yet it is clear that choice is important - a weaker predecessor is 
easier to trope than a stronger, and is a means of making yourself appear a 
strong poet or critic. 
As for the use of a predecessor as a tool for one's own work -- that, too, 
would appear to allov^tlie poet or critic to claim antecedents and 
superiority. Bloom's use of Freud in F o e ^ o ' a n d of Buber in 
Shelley's Mythmaking is conspicuous. In both works Bloom attempts to use 
their writings in the formulation of his own theories. An examination of the 
way in which he formulates his theories should shed some light on his reasons 
for grounding his arguments in this way. Throughout Shelley's Mythmaking 
Bloom relies heavily on Blake's ideas, seeing him as an example of the 
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archetypal poet-prophet and therefore as suitable for comparison with Shelley, 
an unrecognised poet-prophet - or at least that's what Bloom seems to be 
claiming when considering the opinions of other critics. Indeed, Bloom sees 
Blake as a precursor of Shelley in his turn to the Titans {SM, p. 60), and his 
use of the image of the chariot - an image that figured so much in Shelley's 
later mythopoeic poems "The Triumph of Life" and "Prometheus Unbound" 
{SM, p. 76). He interprets Shelley's poetry in Blakean terms, considering 
"The dialectic of 'Prometheus' [to b e ] . . . very close to that of Blake's Ore 
cycle . . . " {SM, p. 93), noting that Jupiter is to Prometheus as Urizen is to 
Albion {SM, p. 98), and that "Asia stands in relationship to Prometheus much 
as Blake's Jerusalem stands to his Albion . . . " {SM, p. 105). He also 
points out that both turned away from this cycle, "Blake . . . in his most 
mature work, . . . and . . . Shelley . . . in his final work." {SM, p. 
93). He sees both poets as thinking that we must move out of a better into a 
worse state in order to attain upper paradise, where "the Thou will not fade into 
an It" {SM, p. 117). But the two poets can be distinguished. Bloom claims 
that Shelley abandoned this myth in "The Triumph of Life," whereas "Blake's 
myth . . . provided its maker with a faith which could not be defeated." 
{SM, p. 117). 
This is not to say that Bloom considers Blake and Shelley to have exactly 
the same myth, and "the tone of [Blake's] discourse has little in common with 
Shelley's presentation . . . " {SM, p. 135), just that Bloom considers Blake 
to be the most useful poet to consider in relation to Shelley. This is because 
Bloom deems both poets to have been apocalyptic humanists, for "each 
ultimately presents a religion parallel to but in competition with Christianity, 
and completely counter to any naturalistic doctrine." {SM, p. 220). It is the 
failure to recognise this that has led to the denigration of their visions of a 
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possible world. It is due to this similarity that Bloom feels free to use Blakean 
concepts to describe Shelley's poetry: thus his description of Rousseau as part 
of "the state of Generation" (SM, p. 255), his description of Asia in 
"Prometheus Unbound" as returning to Beulah in Act III (see SM, pp. 128-
30), and his insistence that Beulah is the land described in "The Witch of 
Atlas" (see 5M, p. 218). 
Unlike Empson, Bloom is not interested in practical criticism, or in 
criticism of the metre, etc. of poetry. He is more interested in the thought 
expressed by the poetry, rather than the mechanics. His major device for the 
explication of a poem in Shelley's Mythmaking is usually another poem. He 
proceeds by finding a poem which he believes to be in some fashion like the 
poem he wants to consider, and then elucidates the similarities and differences 
between the two poems. Thus he compares Shelley's "Mont Blanc" with 
Coleridge's "Hymn before Sunrise" because both were set in the vale of 
Chamouni {SM, pp. 12-13). Shelley's "Ode to the West Wind" is compared 
with one of the Psalms - the "Song of Deborah" - because both are hymns of 
victory, though of a very different kind {SM, pp. 69-71). "The Sensitive 
Plant" is compared with Spenser's "Muiopotmos: or the Fate of the Butterflie" 
and Blake's "Book of Thel" because the other two poems both "have seemed 
to me [i.e. Bloom] appropriate and useful." {SM, p. 148). But one cannot 
help but wonder what Bloom means by "useful." It would seem that from 
such comparisons, and there are many more,'^^ that Bloom hopes to show the 
way in which Shelley creates his own myth, his religion. For the definition of 
religion that Bloom seems to use is that one should hold a cardinal belief, in 
42For example, Spenser's "Garden of Adonis" and the garden of "The Witch of Adas" {SM, 
pp. 1 7 8 f O ; "Epipsychidion" and Blake's "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell" {SM, pp. 2 0 5 f O ; 
"The Triumph of Life" and the Bible {SM, pp. 2 3 2 f O . 
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this case the value of relationship, as well as several subsidiary beliefs - in 
Shelley's case the virtues of " 'Love, Hope, and Self-esteem'" {SM, p. 
101), through which one may achieve the desired state of relationship. 
Bloom does not simply refer to other poets or to Shelley in ^ 
Mythmaking in order to explicate his poetry. There is a strong emphasis on 
previous critical debate in relation to the poems, often introduced before Bloom 
begins his own explication ~ during which he usually indicates in which ways 
he is similar to, has borrowed from, or is different from earlier critics. For 
example, on p. 65 of Shelley's Mythmaking he begins his consideration of the 
"Ode to the West Wind" with the judgroent- of another critic, Oliver Elton. 
There are numerous instances of his referring to other critics. Often they are 
used to highlight the superiority of his reading to theirs -- thus his comments 
on Leavis' reading of the "Ode to the West Wind" (SM, pp. 78ff), or his 
attack on what he sees as Fogle's dualism {SM, pp. 91-92), his denigration of 
any attempt to read Shelley's poetry allegorically - thus his attitude towards 
Grabo {SM, pp. 104-5, 119); his dislike of any interpretation that uses 
Platonism (e.g. SM, p. 130); and especially of any allegorizing of one of 
Shelley's poems in terms of another (e.g. SM, pp. 267ff). 
He writes of several critics' allegorical interpretations of "The Triumph of 
Life" - "No necessity can be demonstrated in any of this allegorizing, and each 
critic can very persuasively demolish the allegorizer who has come before 
him " (SM, p. 242). But in Poetry and Repression Bloom does not 
even mention the evils of allegorization. All canonical readings are swept aside 
because they are "weak." Whether his reading of the Romantic poets involves 
allegorization does not seem to concern him. Yet, as Norris has noted, a 
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peculiar aspect of deconstructive readings is their tendency to allegorize.43 
Allegorization is a central concern because if Bloom cannot distinguish his 
theories from allegorization he could be characterised as simply telling another 
story about various poetical works. Although in the earlier work Bloom is by 
no means a deconstructionist in the same sense that he is today, this tendency 
to allegorize could arguably be found in Shelley's Mythmaking. 
Bloom also carefully uses other critics in order to indicate that he has a 
full understanding of a poem's sources and mechanics. This is especially 
apparent in his comments on "The Triumph of Life" near the beginning of the 
chapter of the same name, where he traces the influences of other poets on 
"The Triumph of Life" via other critics (see SM, p. 222). Other critics are 
also mentioned if he feels they have been important in the formation of his own 
opinions. It is for this reason that he gives the details of Bradley's explication 
of lines 239-43 of "The Triumph of Life" (SM, p. 259). 
Of course. Bloom does also find occasion to agree with earlier critics. 
He finds Pottle helpful, for example, on the concept of relationship in reference 
to the "Ode to the West Wind" -- though Pottle does not use Bloom's 
terminology {SM, p. 73). Fogle is considered to provide useful ideas only 
occasionally, thus Fogle's comments on the "Life of Life" lyric in Shelley's 
"Prometheus Unbound" are taken seriously (SM, p. 125). For that matter, so 
are Frye's comments on the "Book of Thel" 's "fragility" (SM, p. 156), or 
Bradley's on "The Triumph of Life" (SM, p. 250). On other occasions 
Bloom is particularly against a given approach because he feels its assumptions 
do not allow a fair treatment of the poetry, that is, a treatment which 
43christopher Norris, "Openness," rev. of After the New Criticism, by Frank Lenmcchia, 
Essays in Criticism, 32 (1982), pp. 90-91. 
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appreciates the vision the poet tried to attain and the way in which he/she failed 
to do so. Thus his complaint of the New Critics that "If you [i.e. the New 
Critics and others] r e j e c t . . . this kind of writing [i.e. Romantic], then you 
are rejecting a kind of poetry or, at the very least, what our ancestors 
considered to be poetry." {SM, p. 160). The implication is that a rejection of a 
kind of poetry due to one's prejudices shows one to be a poor critic. 
Another of Bloom's main complaints against other critics in Shelley's 
Mythmaking is that they tend to misread poetry by importing their own 
philosophy (isn't this an act of strong reading?) - a complaint closely 
associated with that of allegorizatiop. He complains of one critic's coming "to 
the poem with far too many philosophical notions" (5M, p. 28) without 
questioning the necessity of finding them in the first place. Of Grabo's 
consistent findings of "Neoplatonism" in "The Witch of Atias" and 
"Epipsychidion" when "What counts . . . is the gesture the words 
make . . . ." {SM, p. 203, see also p. 206). This is reminiscent of a 
similar, earlier complaint about the importation of Platonism into readings of 
poetry (see SM, p. 164). At one stage he comments that this kind of 
allegorizing is arbitrary (see SM, p. 186). 
Yet it is also clear that Bloom does not consider that he imparts his own 
philosophy when reading poetry. Bloom spends much effort trying to 
convince readers of his beliefs regarding the nature of poetry, both by 
argument and implied belittling (after all, the term "strong reader" is value 
laden given the usual associations people have with the words "strong" and 
"weak") of those who do not share his opinions. Bloom wants to take us into 
his philosophical universe, wants us to think as he does -- but tries to achieve 
this not by pointing out the problems of current criticism, but largely by 
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erasing it, repressing it. Of course, other modes of criticism do have to be 
referred to, sometimes they cannot be ignored. In such instances Bloom 
distinguishes his approach from that of other critics. 
Bloom is trying to dissociate his criticism from simple ways of 
disparaging it, such as arguing that he imparts his own philosophy to his 
reading of a text (although it should be plain by now that this is just what he 
does), thus his emphasis is on the distinction between his method of criticism 
and allegorization. It is as though allegorization were a drug which at all costs 
must be prohibited, kept out of the land of criticism; otherwise critics become 
hooked, spending their time const^riy allegorizing rather than explicating a 
poem. 
Tied to this is the complaint that critics often create an independent vision 
from that presented by the poem, which they then insist is that of the poem. 
He says, for example, of Knight, that he "illustrates the danger of criticism of 
visionary poetry passing over into independent vision." {SM, p. 196). He 
also complains of Baker's desire to find a pattern linking all of Shelley's 
"epipsyche" figures, finding it "not a critical desire." (SM, pp. 236-37). And 
he is rather cutting towards those critics whose interpretations do not mesh 
with the "facts" of the poem -- as he sees them, in the light of his 
interpretation. Such an approach implies that there is at least one correct 
reading of a poem, the right reading being that which shows Shelley not to 
have been an inconsistent thinker, for "Judged in the context of 
mythopoeia . . . what seems to be a welter of conflicting philosophical and 
psychological notions may be seen to emerge into a clearer and more consistent 
outline." (SM, p. 90). 
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Be that as it may, I remain unconvinced that Bloom's reading of the 
Romantic poets necessarily is the most complex of those readings available 
(accepting the first of his two criteria for the moment), or even that it costs 
most of the poem's strength. Turning to Wasserman's reading of Prometheus 
Unbound one finds an approach more complex than Bloom's by situating the 
"action" of the poem in one mind.''^ Furthermore, one need not accept the later 
Bloom's premise that poetry revolves around one person's will-to-power 
because that need not be the only motivation to write poetry.'^^ 
It could equally be argued against Bloom that in reading Shelley in terms 
of Buber's two primary words in Shelley's Mythmaking he is both 
allegorizing and introducing concepts foreign to Shelley's poetry. Shelley's 
poetry never explicidy mentions the word "Thou" as Bloom uses it, nor the 
concept of Imess. Bloom is allegorizing, bringing his own philosophical 
concepts to the poem, much as any critic does. This does not necessarily mean 
that his approach is invalid. It may be the case, as I believe it is, that one 
cannot help but bring one's own philosophy, and therefore a tendency to 
allegorize, to the reading of any poetry. Why should Bloom think this is so 
evil? Indeed, by the time he came to w r i t e h e no longer 
considered it evil, he no longer considered the issue worthy of attention. 
In Poetry and Repression Bloom's approach is both similar and 
different. He is not particularly interested in the opinions of other literary 
critics. Hartman and de Man are but briefly mentioned (e.g. Hartman, P&R, 
pp. 26, 57-58, 70-72; de M a n , p p . 7 9 , 112). Betty Miller is referred to 
44Earl Wasserman, Shelley's Prometheus Unbound: A Critical Reading (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), passim. 
45m . H. Abrams, "How to Do Things With Texts," PMU^'^P^^ , 46, No. 4 (1979), p. 
586. 
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when discussing the failed quest in Romantic poetry (P&R, p. 191). Most of 
his references are to people who have studied the nature of the self, and one's 
perceptions of oneself. There is a strong emphasis on Freud and Vico (noted 
earlier) as well as Nietzsche (e.g. P&R, pp. 52, 192-93), Rorty (e.g. P&R, 
p. 21), Auerbach and Price (e.g. P&R, pp. 23-24), Wolheim (e.g. P&R, pp. 
131-32), Kierkegaard (e.g. pp. 242-43), Burke (e.g. p. 253), 
Valery (e.g. P&R, pp. 279ff), and Schopenhauer (e.g. P&R, pp. 284-86), to 
name a few. This is in keeping with the change in approach^ the greater 
interest in the concept of "the self," and in particular the poet's conception of 
himself in relation to poetry, and more importantly the emphasis on the poem 
as a form of self-exploration (often not recognised as such by the poem). 
Bloom is no longer interested in situating his criticism in relation to existing 
criticism. In this book he is trying to go beyond canonical criticism to create a 
new criticism designed with the Romantic poem in mind. 
Bloom's reliance on Freud, Vico, and certain Gnostic notions is similar 
to his earlier reliance on Blake and Buber. He focusses on the concept of 
misprision (see P&R, pp. 11-13) and on Gnosis as "a kind of 
'knowledge ' . . . [which] is itself the form that salvation takes, because the 
'knower' is made Divine in such a ' knowing ' . . . " (P&R, pp. 213-14). 
He claims that a Gnostic approach is more suitable than a Platonist or 
Aristotelian one. The latter he considers to have been developed in relation to 
Classical and Enlightenment poetry, whereas "the major traditions of post-
Enlightenment poetry have tended more to the Gnostic stance of misprision" 
(P&R, pp. 13-14), although this in itself is not a reason for preferring this 
approach as a mode of criticism for post-Enlightenment poetry. In fact. Bloom 
prefers a kabbalistic approach, which he thinks blends both the Gnostic and the 
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Platonic-Aristotelian, with its emphasis on reading as translation, clear from its 
acceptance of the necessity of error (see P&R, pp. 14-16), but also its dialectic 
of limitation and representation (see P&R, pp 118-120), both of which are 
developed in relation to poetry. 
It is largely from Freud that Bloom has taken his concept of defence. He 
accepts Freud's (and Vico's) insistence that its origin is a "stance towards 
death" {P&R, p. 10). But Freud differs from a strong poet in that what he 
calls "repression" Bloom considers to be "the imagination of a Counter-
Sublime" in greater poets {P&R, p. 24). Freud's idea of the unconscious is 
accepted, but Bloom denies "the usefulness of the Unconscious, as opposed to 
repression, as a literary term." {P&R, p. 24). Bloom also plays with Freud's 
setting of memory "in the context of anxiety, repression, and defense." {P&R, 
p. 53), though it is not clear whether he sees it as wholly inhering within the 
boundaries formed by these three, or whether it also crosses them, reaching 
into other areas of the psyche. He differs from Freud in seeing a strong poem 
as "a triumph of repression, and not of sublimation . . . " {P&R, p. 135), 
but accepts Freud's placing of repression as unique, "the most elaborate of the 
d e f e n s e s . . . " {P&R, p. 143) - used in formulating the notion of anxiety 
of influence. And yet Bloom also points out that the Freudian notion of 
repression "is an astonishing array of possibly incompatible theories " 
{P&R, p. 232). 
It would be easy to argue that Freud is Bloom's poetic father, but that 
Bloom has hardly progressed beyond clinamen and tessera - that is, beyond 
swerving from the ideas of his "father" and setting up an antithetical 
completion which he fails to complete. 
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The fcx^us of attention regarding other critics in Poetry and Repression 
has shifted from direct comments about their approach to poetry (as in 
Shelley's Mythmaking) to more general statements about the role of criticism, 
for example: 
A poem is a triad . . . an idea of thirdness 
[which] . . . involves us in working out the relation of its 
own text to a composite precursor-text, and of both of these 
to each of us, who as a reader constitutes a third text. 
{P&R, p. 225). 
We are also seen as part of the universe of discourse, though to what 
repressions we as readers may be subject, and what defences we may create, is 
not Bloom's concern. One cannot help wondering whether this should be the 
case. For Bloom: 
The function of criticism at the present time . . . is to fmd a 
middle way between the paths of demystification of meaning, 
and of recollection or restoration of meaning, or between 
limitation and representation. But the only aesthetic path 
between limitation and representation is substitution, and so 
all that criticism can hope to teach . . . is a series of 
stronger modes of substitution The vessels or fixed 
forms break in every act of reading or of writing, but how 
they break is to a considerable extent in the power of each 
reader and of each writer. Yet there are patterns in the 
breaking that resist the power, however strong, of any reader 
and of every writer. These patterns -- evident as sequences 
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of images, or of tropes, or of psychic defenses -- are as 
definite as those of any dance, and as varied as there are 
various dances. But poets do not invent the dances they 
dance . . . . The stronger poet not only performs the 
dance more skillfully than the weaker poet, but he modifies it 
as well, and yet it does remain the same dance. I am afraid 
there does tend to be one fairly definite dance pattern in post-
Enlightenment poetry {P&R, p. 270). 
So for Bloom the task of the critic is to elucidate the patterns of the 
dance, and consider how skilfully the poet has danced the dance. The critic 
both elucidates and evaluates. But might not this activity of the critic be 
complicated by his/her own tendency to misread both other poets and critics? 
And given that the critic might also be subject to repression, might not Bloom's 
explication of the nature of criticism be an elaborate defence against a 
precursor, or against the power of words? But given that this is so, then my 
writing, too, is a defence against repression, and we are all subject to 
repression and therefore we all create defences. In this web there is, then, no 
truth, only less or more interesting hypotheses about the nature of creativity, of 
society, and therefore of our source(s) of repression. Popper once remarked 
that the hallmark of a scientific theory is that it can be proved false. Bloom's 
theory is not scientific. If you disagree with him then that is simply one of 
your defer es, the result of repression. 
This notion that there is a correct reading of the poem is implied 
throughout Poetry and Repression. But the criteria for recognising such a 
"correct" reading have changed. The questions to ask when faced with several 
readings of a poem are: "Which of the . . . readings/misreadings would cost 
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us too much of the poem's strength? Or to say it in more Nietzschean terms, 
of these . . . errors, these . . . composite tropes, which is the most 
necessary error?" {P&R, p. 80). In practice this seems to be saying that the 
correct reading is: a. the one which allows the poem the greatest complexity; 
and b. always mine (i.e. Bloom's). Bluntly, Bloom's theory appears 
irrefutable because to deny it and replace Bloom's terminology with another 
would be doomed to failure - the enterprise could be characterised as that of a 
critic swerving from his/her critical father (Bloom), but whose.criticism is 
weaker than that of the father critic because Bloom's revisionary ratios account 
for the reactions one may have to his criticism. One the other hand, to accept 
Bloom's terminology is to show oneself to be a weak critic. In fact, to escape 
Bloom's system one simply has to treat it as an artefact, not a means of 
defining and divining the truth about poetry, and play with it as one wishes. 
To attempt to battle with Bloom's criticism is only to fall into the trap he has set 
and prove oneself to be a weak critic for not coping with his all-encompassing 
theory as outiined in Poetry and Repression. To deal with Bloom one must 
remain independent of his theory. 
Discussing Bloom's criticism and his attitude towards other critics is 
difficult because Bloom's criticism must be considered as not only situated 
within a critical milieu but also within a (chosen) philosophical milieu (a milieu 
which can include poets, philosophers, psychologists -- a rather loose concept 
of philosophy). Bloom's use of non-critical writers to legitimise his criticism 
and positioning of his writings within a critical milieu in order to increase the 
apparent strength of his own criticism has its beginning early in his critical 
development. Its culmination in his later writings with their focus on strength 
and weakness, reading and misreading, threatens to suppress alternative critical 
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approaches. Philosophy, psychology, poetry, become weapons in a battle for 
the right to interpret. 
Bloom's emphasis on key concepts - redemption and the fallen state, 
originality and repression - sets his criticism apart from Barthes and Empson. 
In Seven Types of Ambiguity William Empson views poetry as a way of 
creating a new vision of society by creating new mental habits, whereas for 
Bloom poetry is a way of coming to some understanding of one's inability to 
attain an ideal society. Although Empson acknowledges the role of the 
influence of precursors in his writing (consider his attitude towards Richards in 
the introduction to Seven Types of Ambiguity ), he does not give it the central 
position Bloom gave in Poetry and Repression. Empson's emphasis appears 
to be on the mechanics of poetry, the way in which poets write in order to 
imply a range of meanings, and via this emphasis he concentrates on the 
mechanics of thought, whereas Bloom's lies on the state a poet must have in 
order to write poetry -- either relationship with the world (in Shelley's 
Mythmaking ), or jealousy and desire to rebel against a poetic father (in Poetry 
and Repression ), thus Bloom's emphasis is on the mechanics of emotion or of 
desire. 
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Conclusion 
On one level Empson's, Barthes', and Bloom's criticism can be viewed 
as exemplifying three different approaches to determining the role of the author 
and reader in specifying the meamng(s) of a text. Each approach can be 
categorised as inadequate because the problem is irresolvable. As a reader or 
critic I can only know my own interpretation of the texts I read, and have only 
limited information available (my reading, my interpretation, of others' 
criticism, their interpretation of texts) to help me determine to what extent my 
reading was influenced by authorial intention. 
While all three authors claim to be trying to resolve the problem of how a 
text's meanings are determined, in fact each uses this problem in his own way 
to posit an altemative critical vocabulary. Empson's seven types of ambiguity, 
Barthes' five codes. Bloom's revisionary ratios, are created to provide 
"objective" proof of particular readings of texts. As such, each critical 
vocabulary can easily be re-drafted in terms of existing critical vocabularies 
(such as that used by the New Critics and their critical descendants). In fact, it 
is the philosophical underpinnings of these new vocabularies that makes them 
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interesting. And while the vocabularies may initially assist^reader to break free 
from viewing texts under existing critical constraints, in themselves they do not 
have sufficient independence from existing critical techniques nor sufficient 
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internal coherence to become serious contenders for the role of a critic's main 
vocabulary. 
What each critic brings to his criticism is a belief that texts are central to 
people's lives -- to maintain sanity (Empson), to defy bourgeois ideology 
(Barthes), to be in relationship with the world, or to face one's repression by 
history (people, texts) and to place oneself in a historical context (Bloom). The 
central myth, then, is that texts matter. In a society where many children rarely 
read, where television is most people's major source of entertainment and 
information about the world, it's a myth that's hard to maintain. Ironically, it 
is only in closed cultures (e.g. China) where textual attempts to subvert society 
matter. In more open, bourgeois societies such attempts at subversion are 
assimilated and even seen as confirming bourgeois values. 
Each critic starts with the premiss that texts matter and then goes on to 
argue for a particular set of beliefs about people and society, using works of 
literature (Empson, Barthes), and sometimes also philosophical writings and 
psychoanalytic techniques (Bloom) to justify these beliefs. Literature, in 
conjunction with criticism and philosophy and psychology, is seen as a means 
of redeeming ourselves form this everyday world. The experience of reading 
is seen as opening the reader's mind, and the experience of re-reading through 
criticism as a re-opening through which new beliefs may be inserted in the 
reader's mind - a polemical opportunity. 
If my language appears sexual, it's intentional. The passive reader, open 
to new beliefs; the active critic, promulgating new ideas, new ways of thinking 
about the world. It is, of course, another myth. The myths of redemption via 
relationship, repression and rebellion as secret acknowledgements of (and 
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therefore legitimisation of) authority, the myth of bourgeois ideology as 
fascistically denying texts their plurality, the myth of ambiguity -- these myths 
are in fact tools used to legitimise the critic's role as disseminator. 
If, instead, we view these myths as tools used to gain authority and 
power over readers, then we come to a different conclusion regarding the role 
of the critic. The critic may be seen as a person whose aim is to win as many 
hearts and minds as possible, seeking immortality in much the same way as 
authors are said to seek immortality (by writing). Inevitably people want 
others to share their beliefs - for this both legitimises the beliefs and confirms 
that we have power over others. 
That's why each critic's discussion of author s and authority is so crucial 
to their work. If an author totally lacks authority then so does a critic, for a 
critic is a kind of author. On the other hand, if an author has complete 
authority then there is no room for criticism. Empson defines the author's 
realm rather loosely, whilst Barthes purports to do away with authors 
altogether (yet lets them in by the back door -- authors may, after all, be 
readers of their own texts). Structuralism, while denying the concept of the 
author as fully determining a text's meaning, relies on the authority of 
authorship to promulgate its own ideology. Of the critics 1 have discussed it is 
only Bloom who explicitly addresses this issue in Poetry and Repression. 
There Bloom accepts that authors have authority and, for that matter, so do 
critics. It is a matter of whose reading will become accepted, who will have 
the greatest authority. 
Perhaps the real issue is how authority is to be obtained - by seduction 
or by more brutal methods. Empson's every man his own critic, or the early 
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Bloom's escapist fantasy or authority through redemptive experience? 
Bloom's battle cry or Barthes' bliss? 
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